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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The experience of physical symptoms is common to all
of us.

In fact, it would be difficult to find someone who

did not feel some sort of bodily discomfort at least a few
times during the year.

For example, a poll of Psychology

Today readers showed that respondents experienced symptoms
such as nasal congestion, sore throat, muscle aches, upset
stomach, and lower back pain sometime during the previous
year (Rubenstein, 1982).

Similarly, a survey of college

students by Comstock and Slome (1973) showed that 70%
of respondents reported that they experience a headache, a
cold, or a sore throat at least once during the academic
year.

The National Center for Health Statistics (1981)

has also reported that of the estimated 1.2 billion office
visits to physicians during 1977 and 1978, approximately
18.3 million were for the primary complaint of headache.
From childhood we are taught that physicians are
experts at making sense of symptoms, yet we must often
diagnose and treat ourselves.

It is common, for example,

to attribute a headache to stress
indigestion.

or a stomachache to

And though these assessments might be
1

2
periodically correct, the average individual is not making
a diagnosis with scientific or professional medical
reasoning.

Instead, he or she is relying upon a subjec-

tive understanding of symptom causality.
If the use of aspirin is thought of as an indirect
measure of the extent to which people self-diagnosis, it
would appear that there are many individuals who diagnose
their own symptoms.

For example, a national health survey

reported that 23% of adults use aspirin at least once a
week, and an additional 52% use it occasionally (NCHS,
1979).

That translates into a lot of aspirin taken in an

attempt to resolve the symptoms of a lot of different
problems.
Even when people decide to seek medical advice, they
still might prefer their own diagnostic analysis.

For

example, it has been reported that 30% to 75% of patients
do not adequately comply with treatment that has been
prescribed by a physician (Haynes, Taylor, & Sackett,
1979; Sackett & Haynes, 1976).

It is not unreasonable to

assume that some of these patients are not compliant
because they do not believe the doctor's assessment of the
problem.

In the Psychology Today poll, it was found that

nearly a third of respondents said that they have ignored
their doctor's orders on at least one occasion in order to

3

treat themselves the way they thought best.

In fact, one

40 year old woman expressed her distrust of physicians
when she said, "Avoid doctors except when you can't
breathe, can't stop the bleeding, can't stand the pain, or
need broken bones set" (p.36).
Self-diagnosing can be a risky business, and the
consequences can be felt on both the individual and
institutional level.

On the one hand, people who

mistakenly feel that every ache and pain is indicative of
a serious condition will place unnecessary strain upon
medical and financial resources.

On the other hand,

people who underestimate the importance of some symptoms
can jeopardize their life.

As an example, consider the

following passage from Hackett and Cassem (1975) that
describes an individual who interpreted his symptoms
incorrectly, and treated himself for a problem that should
have had prompt medical attention.
A 47 year old man was visiting a city for a
business meeting. After a heavy meal he retired to a
hotel room and began to experience severe pericardia!
pain. Immediately, he took two aspirin followed by
sodium bicarbonate. The pain did not abate; he began
to pace the room and did some sitting-up exercises in
an attempt to "bring up the gas." When this was
unsuccessful he took a sleeping pill .•.• Upon his
lying down, the pain spread to his left arm and caused
him to think he was having an attack of bursitis, a
condition he had had in the past. Even though his
bursitic pains always had been confined to the
shoulder and left arm -- totally unlike the chest pain
he was experiencing -- he was able to take comfort

4

from his diagnosis and went into a light sleep. About
an hour later he was awakened by an increase in the
severity of his chest pain. By this time he felt "as
though a truck had run over my chest." Until then the
thought that he was having a heart attack had not
crossed his mind (p.26).
Although this passage is anecdotal, it is
representative of many individuals who misdiagnose cardiac
symptoms and delay seeking medical help until it is sometimes too late (Greene, Moss & Goldstein, 1974; Gutmann,
Pollock, Schmidt & Dudek, 1981; Hackett & Cassem, 1969,
1975; Mathews, Seigel, Kuller, Thompson & Varat, 1983;
Olin & Hackett, 1964).

Clearly, it would be advantageous

to understand how the average person, that is the naive
diagnostician, makes causal attributions for symptoms so
that events such as these could be minimized in the
future.
Currently, there are two symptom attribution models
in the literature, both of which have been derived from
laboratory studies.

These are the hypothesis verification

(Skelton & Pennebaker, 1982) and illness prototype (Bishop
& Converse, 1986) models.

detail later.

These will be discussed in

However, it is important to note that

because these models have been studied under controlled
conditions they account for symptom attributions that
occur in response to particular stimuli.

They are not

equipped to describe how attributions are made under more

5

generalized conditions.
To understand the naive diagnostician, research
needs to focus upon how people deal with symptoms when
they are left to their own devices.

In this way, inves-

tigators will be able to identify the internal resources
(e.g., perceptions, attitudes, knowledge, experience) and
external resources (e.g., cues, discussions with friends)
that are involved in making symptom attributions.

Re-

search at this level has not been done, but it is badly
needed if we are to develop our knowledge of symptom
attribution processes.
It is a basic fact that there is a paucity of
research in this area.

Hence, if current models are to be

studied within realistic contexts and if new models are to
be created, then the scientific community needs to know
more about how the average individual makes symptom
attributions in his or her own environment.

Such infor-

mation will provide a rich source of data that will be
useful for both laboratory and field research.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

Throughout the past forty years there has been
scientific interest in exploring the ways in which the
average individual conceptualizes health and illness.
Although psychologists have shown recent interest in this
area, much of the research has come from the disciplines
of anthropology and sociology.

In general, it has been

shown that factors such as health beliefs, responses to
illness, and health related actions are influenced by
one's cultural and social mileu (e.g., see Fox, 1977;
Illich, 1974, 1976; Mechanic, 1972; Parsons, 1951, 1972;
Paul, 1963; Rosenstock & Kirscht, 1979; Snow, 1974;
Zborowski, 1960).
In more recent years, research has focused upon the
perception of illness causality (Abrams & Finesinger,
1953; DuCette & Keane, 1984; Lowery, Jacobson, & McCauley,
1987; Lowery, Jacobson, & Murphy, 1983; Rudy, 1980; Taylor
& Levin, 1976; Taylor, Lichtman, & wood, 1984).

In addi-

tion, a number of authors have been interested in the
illness causality perceptions of children, especially in
terms of the changes that occur during cognitive development (Bibace & Walsh, 1979; Brodie, 1974; Campbell, 1975a;
6
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Helman, 1978; Koslowsky, Croog & Lavoie, 1978; Mechanic,
1964; Perrin & Gerrity, 1981).

This line of research has

explored the ways in which individuals understand how
various forms of illness are acquired.

Some studies with

children have examined responses to questions such as
"What are measles?," "How does someone get cancer?," "What
happens when someone has a heart attack?," and so on.

As

expected, answers become more complex and conceptual as
children progress through Piagetian stages of development.
By the time one reaches the stage of formal operations,
illness can be thought of as being caused by factors that
are psychological as well as physical, and originating in
the past as well as the present.

Abrams and Finesinger

(1953), for example, found that many adult cancer patients
attributed their condition to some prior event such as a
misdeed, an episode with venereal disease, physical trauma
or self-neglect.

Likewise, Taylor and Levin (1976) have

noted that many women blame their breast cancer on some
guilt provoking experience such as premarital sexual
activity.
Collectively, these studies attempt to understand
the process of what can be called illness attribution;
that is, the way in which individuals ascribe causes for
the acquisition of physical infirmity.

They do not,

8
however, explore mechanisms for symptom attribution; that
is, the way in which people ascribe causes for their
symptomatic experiences.

The former tries to describe how

the average person answers questions such as "How did I
get cancer?" -- while the latter focuses on questions such
as "Why do I have this lump in my breast?".
To date, research on symptom attribution processes
is relatively meager.

In fact, only a few publications

can be found that address this issue directly (Affleck,
Pfeiffer, Tennen, & Fifield, 1987; Bishop & Converse,
1986; Cameron & Leventhal, 1988; Campbell, 1975b; Ditto,
Jemmott, & Darley, 1988; Dobbins, 1988; Dobbins &
Wallston, 1987; Harwood, 1971; Jones, Wiese, Moore, &
Haley, 1981; Kosko & Flaskerud, 1987; Lau & Hartman, 1983;
Leventhal, Nerenz & Straus, 1982; Locker, 1981; Pennebaker, 1980, Skelton & Pennebaker, 1982; Smith & Kane,
1970).
In the existing literature there are two symptom
attribution models.

In the hypothesis verification model,

Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) posit that ill feelings are
similar to other types of sensations in that they are
diffuse and undifferentiated levels of arousal (cf.
Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962).

When someone

experiences an unpleasant or ill sensation, Skelton and

9

Pennebaker (1982) argue that the individual forms a
hypothesis about its cause.

Following this, there is a

search for supporting evidence.

For example, someone who

feels "queasy" might adopt the hypothesis that he or she
has caught the flu.

Given this, there would be a search

for flu-related clues such as a runny nose, an upset
stomach, fever, and so on.

A confirmation of these signs

would be support for the hypothesis.
Although this model has not been tested directly,
Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) provide support for its
validity by citing findings from sensation and symptom
perception research.

In one study, Burnam and Pennebaker

(1977) asked subjects to rate the extent to which they
were experiencing 12 common physical symptoms after having
either run in place or walked in place for two minutes.
Subjects were asked to rate a combination of symptoms that
could typically be associated with flu (e.g., upset stomach, headache, nasal congestion) and physical exertion
(e.g., racing heart, shortness of breath).

In addition,

the experimenter casually mentioned to half of the
subjects -- "As you know, this is the time of the year
when we are surrounded by cold and flu producing viruses,
and many people aren't feeling well" (Skelton & Pennebaker, 1982, p. 109).

The results showed that that the

10
exercise symptoms were rated significantly higher than the
flu symptoms for the individuals who ran in place.

Rat-

ings, however, did not differ for those who walked in
place.

Moreover, when subjects' systolic blood pressure

was partialled out, it was found that ratings for the flu
symptoms exceeded the ratings of the exercise symptoms for
those subjects who were exposed to the flu suggestion.
Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) argue that the suggestion
aided subjects' selective monitoring of flu-related
symptoms, especially when they were experiencing a diffuse
arousal {created by walking in place for a short while).
In another study, Anderson and Pennebaker (1980)
demonstrated that pleasure and pain can function as
alternative interpretations of the same sensory experience, depending upon expectations.

In this study,

subjects signed a bogus consent form that described the
sensations that they might experience during the experiment.

In the pain interpretation group, the consent form

noted that subjects would come into contact with a stimulus which has been found to produce a degree of pain.

In

the pleasure interpretation group, the word "pain" was
replaced with "pleasure."

And in the no interpretation

group, no reference to the experience of pain or pleasure
was made.

After signing the consent form, subjects placed
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their middle finger on a small, vibrating emery board for
one second.
Subjects rated their experience on a 13-point scale
where negative scores indicated degrees of pain, and
positive scores indicated degrees of pleasure.

zero was

the neutral point, indicating neither pain nor pleasure.
In result, it was found that mean ratings were -1.00,
+1.01, and +0.13 for the pain, pleasure, and no interpretation groups, respectively.

Differences among these

ratings were statistically significant and consistent with
expectation manipulations.

Interviews with subjects

revealed that no one thought that their experience could
have been perceived differently from the way it was
perceived.

In other words, subjects in the pain interpre-

tation group believed that the stimulus could not have
been perceived as being pleasurable, and the subjects in
the pleasure interpretation group thought that the
stimulus could not have been interpreted as being painful.
It would appear, then, that expectations affected the way
in which a sensation was perceived.
confirmed expectations.

As such, perceptions

Skelton and Pennebaker (1982)

believe that people search for symptoms in a similar way
to confirm hypotheses about the causes of ill feelings.
In a fundamentally different approach, Bishop and
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converse (1966) have examined how individuals make symptom
attributions in terms of illness prototypes.

Their work

is similar to that of Cantor and Mischel (1977, 1979a,
1979b) who have applied the prototype concept to the area
of person perception.
In their experiment, Bishop and Converse (1986) gave
subjects 12 short scenarios that described hypothetical
individuals who were discussing their symptomatic experiences with a friend.

Although each scenario contained six

symptoms, the experimenters varied the number of symptoms
that were prototypical of a particular target illness.
Prototypical symptoms were derived from pretest research.
In high prototype scenarios, all six symptoms were
prototypical of the target illness.

In medium prototype

scenarios, four symptoms were prototypical and two were
not.

In low prototype scenarios, two symptoms were proto-

typical and four were not.

In addition, three scenarios

were constructed in which no two symptoms were related to
any particular illness or disease.

These were called

random scenarios.
Subjects were asked to read each scenario and then
rate (on a 7-point scale) the extent to which the symptoms
therein were indicative of a particular illness. If subjects thought that the scenario indicated an illness, they
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were to identify it.

Subjects were also asked to rate how

confident they were about their illness identification.
Overall, the results showed that subjects' illness
ratings varied reliably as a function of the number of
prototypical symptoms in the scenarios.

The mean ratings

were 5.17, 4.25, 3.84, and 3.53 for the high, medium, low,
and random prototype scenarios, respectively.

In addi-

tion, it was found that subjects made disease identifications for an average of 68% of the high prototype scenarios while averaging 45%, 32%, and 34% of the medium, low,
and random prototype scenarios, respectively.

Moreover,

the extent to which subjects' illness identifications
matched the implied target illness was also related to the
number of prototypical symptoms.

Subjects made "correct"

or related identifications 64% of the time for high
prototype scenarios, while doing so 30% and 16% of the
time for medium and low prototype scenarios, respectively.
It was also found that confidence about illness
identification varied as a function of the number of
prototypical symptoms.

Mean ratings were 5.21, 3.84,

3.26, and 3.55 for the high, medium, low, and random
prototype scenarios, respectively.

This would indicate

that subjects felt less confident about their illness
identifications as the number of prototypical symptoms
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diminished.

conclusion
Although the hypothesis verification and illness
prototype models provide insight for understanding symptom
attributions, they have limitations.

For example, it

would appear that the former is inadequate for explaining
symptom attributions in the absence of emotional sensation.

According to Skelton and Pennebaker (1982), it is

an ill feeling that triggers the attribution process.

As

such, they do not provide a way for predicting how someone
would try to determine the cause of sensationless symptoms
such as hair loss, vision changes, painless lumps, and
skin discolorations.

Similarly, the work by Bishop and

Converse (1986) does not describe how symptom attributions
are made when prototype processing is not possible.

This

would probably occur in instances where someone experiences a single or unfamiliar symptom.
It is important that research be focused upon symptom attributions as they occur in one's natural environment.

It is this type of research that will uncover the

behaviors and cognitive mechanisms that are most commonly
employed by the average individual when ascribing causes
to symptoms.

RELATED LITERATURE

The research by Skelton and Pennebaker (1982) and
Bishop and Converse (1986) has begun to explore ways in
which symptom attributions are made.

The former have

stressed the importance of ill feelings, hypothesis
formation, and symptom searching, while the latter have
focused upon illness prototype information processing.

It

should be kept in mind, however, that interest in this
topic is very recent.

There is only one article on

illness prototypes, and the hypothesis verification model
has not even been tested directly.
Because the knowledge in his area is so limited,
there is ample opportunity for considering the utility of
other social psychological constructs.

Therefore, this

section will summarize research which suggests that causal
schemas (cf. Kelley, 1972), the availability heuristic
(cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974), and environmental
cues (cf. Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962) might
be involved in symptom attribution processes.

Moreover,

this section will also present constructs such as expectancy/ outcome incongruity (cf. Pyszczynski & Gre•nberg,
1981), persuasion (cf. Storms & Nisbett, 1970), and
15
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attribution perseverance (cf. Ross, Lepper & Hubbard,
1975) in terms of their ability to promote or inhibit
symptom reattributions.

symptom Causal Schemas
Beliefs regarding the connection between symptoms
and their causes is not new.

It is known, for example,

that the Assyrians of 1000 B.C. recited an incantation
against a worm that they believed to cause toothaches
(Sagan, 1980).

Similarly, the medical term "influenza"

has its origin in early Italian culture which linked
illness to the stars -- astral influences (Sagan, 1980).
In modern day society it would be rare to find someone who
believes that aches and pains are the outcome of gingival
worms or celestial entities.

However, it is easy to see

that families, teachers, books, friends, and the media
imbue us with contemporary beliefs regarding the causes of
symptoms.

Mothers, for example, tell their children that

they will get a sore throat or the sniffles if they get
their feet wet.

Popular magazines describe the ways in

which stress makes one feel.

High school health educators

inform students of the outcomes of poor hygiene practices.
In all, we are surrounded by a society that values knowing
the relation between symptoms and their causes.
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Although the term "causal schema" has not directly
been used in the symptom literature, the recognition of
the concept is evident.

The work by Leventhal and

associates (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980; Leventhal &
Nerenz, 1982; Leventhal, Nerenz, & Straus, 1980), for
example, has shown that an explanation for one's symptom
is a basic component of the commonsense representation of
illness; that is, the way in which the average individual
thinks about illness.

In addition, other authors have

identified the importance of interpreting one's symptoms
as a part of the decision to seek or not seek medical
attention (Green et al., 1974; Gutmann et al.,1981;
Hackett & Cassem, 1969; Hackett, Cassem, & Raker, 1973;
Mathews et al., 1983; Safer, Tharps, Jackson, & Leventhal,
1979; Suchman, 1965)
Research on the connections between specific
symptoms and their perceived causes has received little
attention, yet there are a few noteworthy findings.

For

example, Baumann and Leventhal (1985) studied the beliefs
of a nonpatient sample regarding the symptoms of elevated
blood pressure.

They found that individuals believed that

changes in blood pressure could be detected by symptoms
such as a flushed face, light-headedness, headache, and
heart palpitations.

Similarly, Pennebaker and Watson
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(1988) found that subjects believed that symptoms of
sweaty hands, tense stomach, fast pulse, warm or hot body,
and headache correlate significantly with blood pressure
levels.
In other studies, investigators have noted that
causal schemas (although not using this term) can
interfere with an accurate assessment of a symptom, thus
placing the individual at risk.

It is known, for example,

that many heart attack patients wait long periods of time
before seeking medical help.

From interviews with these

patients it has been found that many individuals do not
realize that their early symptoms are indicative of a
cardiac problem.

For example, Olin and Hackett (1964)

reported that nearly half of the patients in their study
believed that a painful chest discomfort was caused by
indigestion or ulcers.

Another 22% thought that they had

a lung problem, leaving just below a third (31%) who
thought about cardiac causes.
In instances where cardiac patients do not have
severe pain, chest symptoms can appear to be gastrointestinal in nature.

Thus, if someone believes that

their symptom is caused by something innocuous, there will
not be a perceived need to seek medical help.

In result,

one will extend the time between symptom onset and the
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realization that medical attention is necessary.

This, in

fact, has been reported in a study by Hackett and Cassem
(1969) who found that patients took significantly less
time getting to the hospital if they thought that their
symptom was cardiac related.
The availability of causes.

It is suggested here

that causal schemas provide a link between symptoms and
their supposed causes.

However, it would be simplistic

to assume that the naive diagnostician tries to make a
symptom attribution by considering every plausible cause.
It is more likely that one calls to mind what he or she
perceives to be the most likely reasons for the symptom
(cf. Rodin, 1978).

For example, when a young and healthy

individual has a headache, causes such as stress, eyestrain or sinus congestion will probably be considered
before causes such as high blood pressure or brain tumors.
Even though someone will recognize that all of these
causes are possible, only the former tend to be common
among young, healthy individuals.
This highlights an important aspect of making
symptom attributions.

That is, the naive diagnostician

probably considers the most available causes first.

Such

an action is based upon what Tversky and Kahneman (1973,
1974) have termed the availability heuristic.

This is an
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implicit cognitive rule that leads one to estimate the
probability of an event by how easily instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.

Use of this heuristic does

not mean that individuals will not consider causes that
are less remote: they just won't consider them initially.
Finding empirical support for the availability
heuristic in the symptom perception literature is extremely difficult.

In fact, only one article appears to

present findings that could be interpreted in terms of
this construct.
Meyer, Leventhal, and Gutmann (1985) examined commonsense models of hypertension among individuals who were
diagnosed with that condition.

During an interview,

subjects were asked if they could tell when their blood
pressure was elevated.

In brief, it was found that the

longer people were diagnosed with hypertension, the more
they were likely to believe that they could detect
pressure changes by a specific symptom.

Although it is

currently believed that people cannot tell when their
blood pressure is high (Isselbacher, Adams, Braunwald,
Petersdorf, & Wilson, 1980), it would appear that hypertension became increasingly more available to explain
particular symptoms over time.
It is expected that the availability of causes can
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be based upon a number of factors.

Blacks, for example,

are probably more likely to think of sickle cell anemia
than are Caucasians.

The menstrual cycle is an easily

available cause for some symptoms in women.

And to coal

miners, black lung disease is likely to be one of the
first causes considered when faced with respiratory
problems.

Hence, health status, sex, race, and occupation

are some of the factors that can affect the availability
of causes.
Causal cues.

If causal schemas present connections

between symptoms and their perceived causes, how does one
make an attribution when there could be a variety of
plausible explanations for a symptom?

One possible

mechanism is that the naive diagnostician makes use of
causal cues that are found in the environment or recalled
from memory.

In essence, environmental cues can be

construed as observations that aid in selecting a cause
from a causal schema.

For example, someone might be led

to attribute their intestinal upset to the flu upon
hearing a weather reporter say that "The flu season is
upon us" (cf. Burnam & Pennebaker, 1977).

Assuming that

the flu is already one of the perceived causes for the
symptom, the reporter's statement acts as a clue, guiding
the selection of that cause.
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In addition to observations, people can be induced
to make attributions based upon suggestions from others.
For example, someone who is experiencing stomach pain
might come to believe that he is having an attack of
appendicitis based upon a home diagnosis made by a friend
or relative.

In general, then, environmental causal cues

can be thought of as external sources of information that
raise the probability of selecting one particular perceived cause over others.
Memory causal cues can also be influential in
selecting a cause for a symptom.

Memories of family

members suffering or dying from particular ailments, or
recollections of prior experiences with a symptom can be
instrumental in making an attribution.

A young women, for

example, whose mother died from cancer will no doubt be
prone to think of this disease if she were to observe an
unusual lump.

The memory of her mother's ordeal might be

strong enough to direct her in selecting cancer as a cause
for any symptom where this disease is a possibility.
A recent study was conducted by Cameron and Leventhal (1988) that demonstrates the influence of environmental cues upon symptom attributions.

In their study,

college undergraduates were asked to imagine that they
were experiencing a set of physical symptoms on the
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following day.
symptoms.

Participants read one of three sets of

These were:

(1) an ambiguous set of six

symptoms that had been previously rated by undergraduates
as being strongly related to both illness and stress;

(2)

six mononucleosis symptoms; and (3) six diabetes symptoms.
The participants were then asked to make an open-ended
interpretation of the symptoms.

After that, they were

asked to rate the extent to which the symptoms could be
due to stress and to an illness.

For half of the

participants, the following day was Saturday.

For the

other half, the following day was a day on which a midterm
examination was scheduled.

It was the investigators'

belief that the midterm examination would act as an
environmental stress cue, thus influencing individuals to
attribute the hypothetical symptoms to stress.
In line with expectations, Cameron and Leventhal
(1988) found that when the stress cue was present, 73.5%
of the participants mentioned a stress theme in their open
ended response.

When the stress cue was absent, only

34.5% of the individuals mentioned a stress theme. In
addition, participants provided higher stress ratings for
the symptoms when the stress cue was present, and lower
stress ratings when the cue was absent.
Cue competition.

Due to the sheer volume of
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information that impinges upon someone throughout the day,
it is possible that the naive diagnostician can encounter
two or more causal cues.

For example, someone with a

headache might realize that he or she is worried about an
impending tax audit (a causal cue for stress) and has
recently been trying to catch up with a substantial amount
of professional reading (a causal cue for eyestrain).
These cues suggest different causes for the same symptom,
and thus can be thought of as being in competition.

If it

is assumed that someone will attempt to make a singular
attribution at any one time, then cue competition needs to
be resolved.
Resolution of cue competition can be accomplished in
a number of ways.

Sex differences, for example, might

bias individuals into giving preference to cues that
indicate different types of causes.

For example, in

studying cancer patients' adaptation to a dry colostomy 1 ,
Sutherland, Orbach, Dyk and Bard (1952) found that men
tended to attribute accidental spillage to dietary
indiscretions while women tended to identify emotional
upsets.
Individual differences can also predispose people to
bias their attention to or from certain types of cues.
For example, individuals who are high on self monitoring
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(Snyder, 1979) or field dependence (Witkin, 1959) might be
prone to consider environmental cues over memory cues
because they have a tendency to be vigilant for external
information.

Similarly, individuals whose fear is easily

aroused might tend to avoid cues that point to a cause
that provokes anxiety such as cancer or heart trouble.
Recent research by Ditto, Jemmott, and Darley (1988)
suggests that individuals, in general, might be inclined
to ignore causal cues that indicate the presence of a
serious disease or illness.

In their study, college

students were led to believe that they either exhibited or
did not exhibit a "thioamine acetylase" (TAA) deficiency
from a bogus saliva test that was conducted in the
laboratory.

Everyone was told that the TAA test was

recently developed to identify individuals who are
susceptible to a variety of pancreatic disorders.

Results

showed that the participants in the deficiency-present
group displayed a lower sense of illness threat than those
in the deficiency-absent group.

In particular, the

individuals in the former group felt that the TAA test had
a greater false-positive rate, and that TAA deficiency was
less life-threatening.

The authors concluded that when

people are faced with the threat of an illness, they
attempt to reduce that threat by minimizing its serious-
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ness.

Hence, it is possible that when individuals are

faced with multiple causal cues, they might intuitively
ignore the cues that suggest the presence of a serious
illness.
Another way of resolving cue competition is through
salience.

A cue becomes salient if it in some way is more

noticeable than another.

By this, it stands out in the

foreground and becomes more available for use.

Other

researchers (e.g., McArthur & Post, 1977; Taylor & Fiske,
1975) have manipulated salience and found it to affect
attribution processes in other contexts.
Resolution of cue competition through salience might
provide an explanation for some of the findings in studies
that have examined symptomatic experiences.

Tonks, Rack

and Rose (1968), for example, reported that women were
less likely to commit suicide during the week prior to
menstruation if they had experienced premenstrual
symptoms.

This was explained by noting that women tend to

attribute their symptoms to bodily changes during this
time.

As such, this prevents them from focusing upon

environmental factors such as hostility from others or
stressful situational demands to explain feelings of
depression and/or irritability.
In the same vein, Rodin (1976) found that under
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conditions of high test anxiety, women who were experiencing strong menstrual symptoms performed significantly
better on a test than others who were not menstruating.
she reasoned that symptomatic women did better because
they could attribute an externally produced distress (test
anxiety and fear of shock) to their own bodily changes.
Non-menstruating women did not have the opportunity to
make such an attribution for their similar sense of
discomfort.

Hence, in both studies it is possible that

women's menstrual cycle cues were more salient than stress
or anxiety cues, thus affecting attributions for their
symptoms.
Another example of cue salience can be found in the
studies that have examined the reactions of medical
students to the highly stressful and exhausting aspects of
their professional training.

It has been reported that

about 70% of these students exhibit a form of hypochondriasis known as medical students' disease (Hunter,
Lohrenz, & Schwartzman, 1964;
man, 1966).

Woods, Natterson, & Silver-

Characteristically, the stress imposed by

medical education creates chronic physiological arousal
which often precipitates identifiable symptoms such as
heart palpitations.

In reaction, some students make an

attribution for their symptom that is similar to the
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diagnosis of some recently seen patient or clinical
anecdote.

Although it would be expected that medical

students' disease should decrease over the time of
training, Woods, Natterson, and Silverman (1966) found
that it was observed with almost equal frequency
throughout the four years of medical school.
Keeping in line with the notion of cue salience,
medical students' disease is not that surprising.
Although much of their symptomatology seems to be caused
by stress, these students might find disease cues more
salient out of the intense encounter with infirmity, both
on the wards and in text books.

Promoting Symptom Reattribution
Expectancy/outcome incongruity.

In studying the

commonsense models of illness, Leventhal and his associates (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980; Leventhal &
Nerenz, 1982; Meyer, Leventhal, & Gutmann, 1985) have
asked patients with hypertension, cancer, and serious
coronary problems to discuss the subjective understanding
of their illness.

In addition, Lau and Hartman (1983)

have taken a somewhat similar approach toward typical,
less severe types of sickness.

Overall, it has been found

that the common sense representation of illness possesses
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five basic components:

(1) determining the nature of

one's problem (i.e., making a symptom attribution), (2)
estimating the short- and long-term effects of the problem, (3) estimating the temporal course of the problem,
(4) determining the factors that led to the onset of the
problem (i.e., an illness attribution), and (5) determining how one goes about recovering from the problem.
The second and third components of this model
suggest that individuals have expectations about their
perceived health problem.

For example, if someone

attributes a watery nasal discharge to a head cold, he or
she will probably recognize the problem as being harmless,
and expect to have this symptom for three or four days.
If, on the other hand, it is believed that the flu is
causing the symptom, one might expect to eventually be
"laid up" for a couple of days with additional symptoms
such as body aches and chills.

Hence, expectations about

future outcomes and experiences naturally follow from a
symptom attribution.
There might be instances, however, when an expected
course of events does not match what really happens.

For

example, a person might attribute his symptoms to a head
cold and then find himself confronted with nausea and
vomiting.

Likewise, someone might feel that he is coming
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down with the flu, only to discover that his symptoms
abate as soon as he leaves work.

Hence, it is expected

that the incongruity between one's attributional expectations and the observed course of events will stimulate a
reattribution.

Moreover, the unexpected actions and

sensations will provide the individual with information
that will guide him or her in making a reattribution.
The work of Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1981) has
demonstrated that attributional processes are instigated
when expectancies are disconfirmed.

In their experiment,

subjects were asked to observe and form an impression of
another subject (really a confederate) in the context of
what they believed was a study on "getting acquainted."
Subjects were led to believe that the confederate would
either agree or refuse to do a favor for the experimenter.
During the study, the confederate either agreed or refused
to do the favor, thus confirming or disconfirming subjects' expectations.
Later, subjects were given the opportunity to choose
and examine the answers to any five questions on a 10 item
questionnaire that was purported to have been completed by
the confederate at an earlier time.

Unknown to the

subjects, the bogus questionnaire was made up of five
"helping-relevant" items and five "interesting" items.
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The former were perceived by a pretest sample to be useful
in understanding why someone would either agree or refuse
to do a favor for an experimenter in a psychology study.
The latter questions were perceived as being interesting
things to discover about someone upon an initial meeting.
In essence, the results showed that subjects chose
more helping-relevant items when expectancies were
disconfirmed.

Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1981} argue that

the incongruity between expectations and outcomes instigated attributional processing, and this was evidenced in
the type of questions that were selected.

In a similar

way, it is expected that individuals will be instigated to
make a reattribution for their symptom when outcomes do
not match the expectancies that are based upon an initial
attribution.
The tendency to make a reattribution in the face of
expectancy/outcome incongruity can also be understood in
terms of cognitive dissonance. Carlsmith and Aronson
(1963} have argued that dissonance is aroused when an
event occurs that disconfirms an expectancy.

In essence,

one's cognition that an event is expected to occur is
dissonant with the cognition that the event did not occur.
In result, the true outcome is perceived as unpleasant.
This could lead one to reconsider initial expectations.
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Persuasion.

Another way in which a person can make

a reattribution is to be persuaded to do so.

Here,

persuasion refers to the attempt at having someone accept
a new attribution for the same symptomatic experience.

It

does not mean that one is trying to persuade another into
believing in a fallacious cure.

Overall, persuasion

probably occurs most frequently in the doctor's office.
Much of the research done on persuasion has focused
on attitudes and opinions.

This is a line of work that

was started by Carl Hovland and his associates at Yale
University (e.g., see Oskamp, 1977).

However, some of

that work seems applicable in the context of symptom
attributions.

For example, in studying the effects of a

persuasive communication it has been repeatedly found that
a message from a high credibility source produces more
attitude change than one from a low credibility source
(see Insko, 1967 for a review).

This finding would

suggest that people will be more likely to make a
reattribution if persuaded by a credible individual.
Obviously, health professionals, especially doctors, have
this credential. It is they who can persuade one to
believe that a stomach pain is being caused by an ulcer,
not "nerves" as one might have initially expected.
In addition to source credibility, a person's level
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of persuasibility might also influence the degree to which
they can be influenced in accepting a new attribution.
someone who is high in persuasibility might change an
attribution at the suggestion of almost anyone.

Those who

are low in persuasibility might require a credible source
before making such a change.
A study that demonstrates symptom reattribution
through persuasion was done by Storms and Nisbett (1970)
with insomniacs.

It has been known since the mid 1960's

that when trying to fall asleep, insomniacs experience
high levels of autonomic arousal.

Frequently, they

complain of symptoms such as accelerated heart rate,
increased body temperature, racing thoughts and sweating.
These authors have argued that insomniacs tend to
exacerbate their condition with pejorative self
inferences.

That is, they believe that their sleep

problem is caused by internal factors that are out of
control.
In the Storms and Nisbett (1970) study, participants
with sleep disturbances were recruited for a dream
research project.

Some were informed that a pill (really

a placebo) they had to ingest prior to retiring would have
the effect of increasing their level of arousal.

In

essence, these subjects were told that their familiar

)
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bedtime symptoms would be caused by some other outside
factor (persuasion).

Another group of similar subjects

was told that the pill would lower their level of arousal
and relax them (a fallacious cure).
It was expected that subjects in the first group
would be able to reattribute their sensations to an
external source, thus making them less anxious about their
inability to sleep.

It was predicted that these subjects

would fall asleep in less time than usual.

It was also

expected that subjects in the second group would not have
an external source to attribute presleep sensations.

As

such, their emotional discomfort should be escalated
because they would be experiencing symptoms in lieu of
expected tranquilization.

Here it was predicted that

subjects would be kept awake longer than usual.
The results of the study confirmed these
predictions.

Subjects in the first group reported

decreased sleep onset latencies of about twelve minutes.
The other subjects reported increased latencies of about
fifteen minutes.

It would appear, then, that people can

be persuaded to consider another cause for their symptom
after an initial attribution has been made.
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l._nhibiting Symptom Reattribution
Expectancy/outcome congruity.

Up to this point, the

discussion has been focused upon processes that could
promote or enhance reattribution.

It is possible,

however, that once the naive diagnostician has identified
a cause, he or she might be subject to factors or conditions that will inhibit a reattribution.

In other words,

there might be situations in which one could be led to
maintain an initial attribution.
It was noted earlier that the research findings of
Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1981) indicated that disconfirmed expectancies about a confederate's behavior led to
a greater amount of attributional processing by subjects.
This, however, was contrasted by the finding that confirmed expectancies led to less (if any) attributional
processing.

The authors found a highly significant

expectancy-by-behavior crossed interaction.

Pyszczynski

and Greenberg (1981) suggest that the observation of
expected outcomes inhibits (or at least does not promote)
attributional processing because the expectancy acts as a
pre-existing explanation for the observation.

Hence, it

would appear that there is no intuitive need to engage in
causal reasoning when expectancies are confirmed.
This finding has been evidenced in other studies
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that have examined the relationship between attribution
and expectancies (Jones & Harris, 1967; Jones, worchel,
Goethals & Grumet, 1971; Rosenfield & Stephan, 1977).

For

example, Jones et al. (1971) told subjects that another
student on campus either favored or opposed marijuana
legislation.

Subjects then read an essay by this student

that either favored or opposed marijuana legislation.
Half the subjects were told that the student was forced
into writing the essay, while the other half was told that
the student freely chose to write the essay.

In result,

it was found that the degree of choice did not influence
subjects' attributions when there was congruity between
the nature of the student's position (i.e., the expectancy) and the nature of the essay discussion.
Given these research findings, it could be reasoned
that when the expectancies based upon an attribution are
congruent with outcomes, the naive diagnostician will not
desire to make a reattribution.

Hence, if someone

attributes nasal congestion to the flu and soon afterwards
experiences a fever with muscle aches, there would be no
reason to assume that another cause is operating.
Attribution perseveration.

There is some research

which indicates that individuals have a tendency to
maintain an attribution even if they are informed that the
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attribution is erroneous (Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, 1975;
Ross, Lepper, Strack and Steinmetz, 1977).
Ross et al.

For example,

(1975) conducted a study in which success and

failure on an experimental task was manipulated.

Even

though subjects were informed later that their performance
was controlled by the experimenter, successful subjects
continued to believe that they had higher task abilities
with respect to those who had failed.

Rodin (1978) has

noted that attribution perseveration is thought to be an
information processing phenomenon.

It would appear that

once information (i.e., an attribution) is coded, it
becomes independent of the original coding scheme.

Hence,

the information is no longer affected by that scheme or
any other information.
In a related study, Ross et al. (1977) asked subjects to read a case history of someone who had psychological problems.

They were then asked to imagine that

this person either committed suicide or made a financial
contribution to the Peace Corps.

Subjects were also asked

to create an explanation for this event.

After this,

subjects rated the likelihood of these events actually
happening for the person in the case history.

In result,

it was found that subjects who envisioned and explained
suicide perceived this event to be more likely in
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comparison to those who thought about the Peace Corps
contribution.

Likewise, those who imagined and explained

the contribution saw it as being more likely than those
who thought about suicide.

Hence, these results suggest

that merely thinking about an event raises the subjective
probability of its reality.
If it is true that individuals have a tendency to
maintain an attribution, then it would be reasonable to
assume that the naive diagnostician will naturally not
want to make a symptom reattribution.

As such, he or she

would give attention to attribution-relevant experiences,
and ignore signs and symptoms that indicate the possibility of other causes.

Conclusion
In this presentation, it has been argued that little
is known about symptom attribution processes.

Although

there are two explanatory models in the literature, both
have been generated from laboratory research and do not
necessarily describe how individuals make symptom attributions on a day-to-day basis.

If the thoughts and

actions of the naive diagnostician are to be understood,
research needs to focus upon how individuals make symptom
attributions in their natural environment.

This will
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identify basic facts that can be used for future research,
both theoretical and applied -- in the laboratory and in
the field.
Both symptom attribution models have been described
in this presentation.

However, other social psychological

constructs such as causal schemas, the availability
heuristic, and causal cues have been discussed in terms of
their relevance to the naive diagnostician.

In addition,

processes that might promote reattributions (i.e., expectancy/outcome incongruity and persuasion) as well as
inhibit reattributions (i.e., expectancy/outcome congruity
and attribution perseverance) have been offered.
Conceivably, these constructs could be integrated
into a model that represents a symptom attribution process.

The present research, however, was not approached

with a model as the starting point.

Using the above

constructs as a guide, data were collected with the intent
of constructing a symptom attribution model as the
endpoint of the study.

It was felt that this would be

more beneficial for gaining insight into the true nature
of the naive diagnostician.

THE PRESENT RESEARCH INVESTIGATION

The present investigation was organized into two
parts.

In Study 1, subjects were asked to identify causes

for each of five common symptoms.

The purpose of this was

to undertake a detailed analysis of the number and type of
causes that were generated.

This was done to learn basic

facts about symptom attributions before time and resources
were devoted to an investigation of actual self-diagnosis.
The major focus of Study 2 was to examine the
attributional activity of individuals who encountered a
real symptom.

Within the context of a survey, subjects

were asked to describe thoughts and actions that occurred
throughout the course of a recent symptomatic experience.
Most importantly, they were asked to identify the causes
or self-diagnoses that came to mind during that time.
The organization of the survey was based upon the
assumption that a symptom attribution is initially formed
with the aid of informational cues and is then affected by
a diversity of subsequent experience.

As such, one's

initial attribution is likely to be strengthened or
weakened by the information and experiences that occur
over time.

This implies that the naive diagnostician is
40
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influenced by easily attainable information.

Given the

lack of professional training, it is presumed that he or
she is unable to effectively distinguish medically
relevant from medically irrelevant data.

Hence, almost

any kind of information could be useful.

This would not

seem to be an efficacious method of self-diagnosis;
however, it is probably the best that one can generally
do.
Sources of information such as lay conferral, the
perception of being sick, medical guides, health professionals, and the outcome of self-treatment were
examined in terms of their potential for strengthening or
weakening the belief in one's symptom attribution.

It was

predicted that when beliefs are strengthened, people will
be likely to maintain their attributions.

When belief in

one's attribution is weakened, it was predicted that he or
she will be prone to make a reattribution, one that is
consistent with new information.
Each of the above sources is discussed in more
detail later.

However, the data analysis for Study 2

sought to answer two basic questions: {1) to what extent
do individuals encounter information from the above
sources, and {2) to what extent to they promote and
inhibit the tendency to make a symptom reattribution?
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College students were used for both studies.
Although an older group of individuals might have a more
diverse experience with symptomatology, it was expected
that college students would be equally inclined to make
symptom attributions.

College students have been used in

other health and symptom perception studies with success
(e.g., see Bishop & Converse, 1986; Cameron & Leventhal,
1988; Comstock & Slome, 1973; Cox, 1983; Krantz, Baum &
Wideman, 1980; Lau, 1982; Lau & Hartman, 1983; Moos & van
Dort, 1977; Pennebaker, 1982; Pennebaker, Burnam,
Schaeffler & Harper, 1977; Pennebaker & Skelton, 1981;
Pennebaker & Watson, 1988; Peterson, 1986; Weinstein,
1982).

Moreover, the principal investigator has collected

symptom attribution data from college students in the past
and has found that meaningful responses were obtained.

METHOD FOR STUDY 1

subjects
The subjects for this study were 35 introductory
psychology students who received course credit for their
participation.

The demographic characteristics of these

individuals are displayed in Table 1.

As it can be seen,

the subjects were predominately female, Caucasian, freshmen who were enrolled in non-health oriented curricula.
No one was a trained health professional.

The mean age of

subjects was 18.46 years (SD• 1.12).

Instruments
All participants completed two short instruments
that were affixed together in a questionnaire labeled
"SYMPTOM SURVEY" (see Appendix A}.

The first was a

demographic data sheet that collected basic information
about the responder.

The form asked individuals to

identify their gender, age, racial affiliation, grade
The data
point average 2 , and position at the university.
sheet also asked responders if they were enrolled in a
health professions curriculum or were a practicing health
professional.
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Subjects in Study

!

------------------------------------------------------Relative
Characteristic

Frequencya

Frequency

Gender
Male

10

.29

Female

25

.71

23

.66

Black

2

.06

Hispanic

1

.03

Oriental / Asian

8

.23

Other

1

.03

26

.74

Sophomore

4

.11

Junior

4

.11

Senior

1

.03

Racial Affiliation
Caucasian

student Rank
Freshman

(table continues)
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------------------------------------------------------Relative
Characteristic

Frequencya

Frequency

curriculum
Health Professions
Other

6

.17

29

.83
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The second instrument asked subjects to identify
what they believed to be the causes for a set of five
common symptoms: headache, watery eyes, congested nose,
upset stomach, and sore throat.

These symptoms were

chosen because they were found to be the most frequently
experienced by a group of college students who were
surveyed at an earlier time.

In an effort to control for

presentation effects, the five symptoms were presented in
random order to each subject (cf. Underwood, 1966}.
For each symptom, participants were asked to list
all of the causes that came to mind.

They were informed

that there were no right or wrong answers on the task, and
were provided with 15 spaces upon which answers could be
written.

In addition, there was a note on the bottom of

each page that told the participant to use the backside of
the paper if needed.

Procedure
The subjects who volunteered for this study met
collectively at a designated time and place.

At the

beginning of the session, the experimenter welcomed everyone and announced that the purpose of the study was to ask
a group of individuals to identify what they believed to
be the causes for a set of symptoms.

The experimenter
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emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers on
this task, and that it was important to write down
anything that came to mind.

It was also announced that

there was no time limit for the task; participants could
take as much time as needed.

At that point, everyone was

given a copy of the Symptom Survey to complete.

Research Questions and Data Analysis
There were three main questions that guided the data
analysis for Study 1.

These questions are listed below

with the procedures that were used to answer them.

Question 1: WHAT TYPES OF CAUSES WERE IDENTIFIED BY
SUBJECTS?
To answer this question, the perceived causes for
each of the five symptoms (N • 911) were copied onto
individual index cards.

These cards were separated

according to symptom type and were then sorted into piles
in order to identify themes of responses.

From this,

categories were developed for each of the five symptoms.
Subjects' perceived causes were then classified and
tallied.
The categories of perceived causes (N

=

64) were

then classified according to the dimensions of locus,
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stability, and controllability.

These are three

dimensions that have been posited by Weiner (1979) to
underlie causal attributions (also see Russell, 1982).
This was done in order to examine the nature of the
perceived causes that were identified by subjects.

For

example, if individuals tended to list causes that were
forms of illness or were serious in nature, it was
presumed that most of the categories would be classified
as internal, stable, and uncontrollable (e.g., a brain
tumor).

On the other hand, if perceived causes tended to

be transient or innocuous influences, then it would be
expected that most of the categories would be classified
as external, unstable, and controllable (e.g., stress).
Classifying the causes of symptoms with Weiner's
(1979) dimensions posed some difficulties.

After all, his

tripartite scheme was originally proposed to codify the
causes of behavior, not physical symptoms.

However, other

investigators such as Dobbins (1988), and Dobbins and
Wallston (1987) have been successful in studying arthritis
patients' perceptions of their conditions in terms of the
related dimensions of internality, stability, and
globality. 3

Thus it was felt that Weiner's scheme could

be used for the present study if appropriate and careful
criteria were established.
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The dimension of locus was one of the most difficult
to classify.

This is because most causes appeared to have

both an internal and external nature.

For example, a flu

virus originates outside one's body, yet it has to be
internalized before one begins to feel symptoms of the
flu.

Thus, if subjects report that the flu is a possible

cause for a congested nose, should this be classified as
internal or external?

To confuse matters even more, it

would seem that any cause would have to be internalized to
~

degree before it could have an effect upon an indi-

vidual.

Does this then suggest that all causes should be

classified as internal?

As it can be seen, the develop-

ment of classification criteria was necessary.
In response to the difficulties posed by this task,
the following criteria were used.

A cause was considered

EXTERNAL if it referred to an observable physical influence

(i.e., an event, entity, or activity) that is

outside one's body and is present at the time a symptom
appears or shortly before it appears.

A cause was

considered INTERNAL if it referred to an influence that
takes place primarily within the body before or while a
symptom is perceived.

Thus, if one were considering a

headache, causes such as loud noises, hot weather, and
noxious fumes would be classified as external;

while
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fatigue, eye strain, and an allergy would be classified as
internal.
A cause was considered STABLE if it referred to an
influence that is relatively permanent or has the nature
of lasting for a considerable period of time.

A cause was

considered UNSTABLE if it referred to an influence that is
short-lived or temporary in nature.

Thus, an allergy and

a brain tumor would be classified as stable causes for a
headache; while a cold, stress, and overexertion would be
classified as unstable.
A cause was considered CONTROLLABLE if one could
potentially prevent the cause from happening, or if one
could alleviate a symptom by affecting the cause without
the need of professional medical help. 4 Causes that did
not meet at least one of these two criteria were considered UNCONTROLLABLE.

Hence, a hangover, fatigue, and

eye strain would be classified as controllable causes of a
headache; while a brain tumor and an allergy would be
classified as uncontrollable.
After the categories of perceived causes were
classified in terms of locus, stability and controllability, the occurrences of the levels of each dimension
were tallied and compared with one-way chi-square tests.
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Question 2: DOES THE NUMBER OF PERCEIVED CAUSES VARY AS A

FUNCTION OF SYMPTOM TYPE?

To answer this question, participants received an
enumeration score for each of the five symptoms.

This

score was operationally defined as the number of perceived
causes that were listed.

However, enumeration was

construed as a measure of the extent to which someone
could imagine or think of possible causes for a symptom.
In other words, the enumeration score was viewed as the
degree to which causes of symptoms "come to mind."
It was expected that enumeration scores would vary
among the symptoms because peoples' experiences with
symptoms vary.

For example, some symptoms (an upset

stomach) occur more frequently than others (a nose
bleed). 5

Likewise, some symptoms (a headache) are

discussed frequently and receive a high degree of media
attention, while others (an ear ache) are hardly ever the
object of discussion or the focus of a highly publicized
health report.

As such, it is possible that peoples'

variable experience with symptoms might lead them to think
about more possible causes for one symptom over another.
The enumeration scores were used in a repeated
measures analysis of variance to test the null hypothesis
that the tendency to think of possible causes did not vary
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among the five symptoms in the study.

A Student-Neuman-

Keuls post-hoc analysis (cf. Winer, 1971) was chosen to be
used if the result of the ANOVA was statistically
significant.

Question 3: HOW MUCH OF THE VARIANCE IN THE ENUMERATION
SCORES FOR A SYMPTOM IS EXPLAINED BY THE
VARIANCE IN DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AS WELL
AS THE VARIANCE IN THE ENUMERATION SCORES
FOR THE OTHER SYMPTOMS?

To answer this question, hierarchical linear
multiple regression analyses (cf. Cohen & Cohen, 1975)
were conducted.

There were five analyses - one for each

of the symptoms in Study 1.
conducted in two steps.

All the analyses were

On step 1, a set of demographic

variables was entered as the first component of the
regression equation.

The set consisted of age, gender,

and two dummy variables that reflected racial affiliation
(Caucasian vs. non-Caucasian) and curriculum (health
professions vs. other). 6 On step 2, a single score was
entered.

This was the average of the enumeration scores
for the four other symptoms. 7 Thus, when the variance in

enumeration scores for a headache was being explained, the
enumeration scores for watery eyes, congested nose, upset
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stomach, and sore throat were averaged and entered on step
2 of the analysis.
It was reasonable to assume that demographic characteristics would be related to attribution processes.
Other studies have found that college students experience
symptoms as a function of their year in school (Comstock &
Slome, 1973; Greenly & Mechanic, 1976; Moos & Van Dort,
1977).

Moreover, Pennebaker et al. (1977) found that

female college students tend to be more symptomatic than
males over time.

As such, it is possible that demographic

variables might also be related to symptom attribution
processes.
It was difficult to predict how the average enumeration score for step 2 of the regression analysis would
behave.

However, if there is a consistency in the way

that causes for symptoms come to mind, it would be
expected that this score would correlate directly and
reliably with the criterion score in each regression
equation.

RESULTS FOR STUDY l

The Perceived Causes for Five Symptoms (Question
Types of perceived causes.

11

The categories of

perceived causes for each of the five symptoms are listed
in Tables 2 through 6.

Overall, these tables share three

basic findings.
First, subjects identified a variety of attributions
for each of the symptoms.

In all, 64 categories of

perceived causes were identified.

Eleven to 15 categories

were found to be associated with each of the symptoms.
Second, each table shows considerable variation in
terms of the number of individuals who mentioned a particular cause.

It can be seen that there are some causes

that were identified by most everyone, and some that were
mentioned by only a few.

As an example, Table 2 shows

that stress was identified as a possible cause for a
headache by nearly three quarters of the subjects, while
noxious fumes was mentioned by only four individuals.
Figure 1 examines the variability for each of the
five symptoms by displaying the proportions of subjects
who mentioned a particular cause.

The abscissa identifies

perceived causes in generic order (i.e., first, second,
54
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Table 2
The Perceived Causes for

~

Headache

Category of
Perceived Cause

Relative
Frequencya

Frequency

stress/ter;i.sionb

26

.74

Fatigueb

19

.54

Emotional distressb

18

. 51

A coldb

16

.46

Loud noises

13

.37

Head injury

13

.37

An illnessb

12

.34

Lack of food

12

.34

Alcohol/drugsb

11

.31

Overexertionb

10

.29

Eye strainb

9

.26

Problem with head organs

8

.23

Hot/cold weatherb

6

.17

Allergyb

5

.14

Noxious fumes/smokeb

4

.11

aN• 35.

bA perceived cause that is identified with at

least one other symptom.
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Table 3
!!}_! Perceived Causes for Watery Eyes

--------------------------------------------------Category of
Perceived Cause

Relative
Frequencya

Frequency

--------------------------------------------------Particle in the eye

26

.74

Smoke/fumesb

22

.63

.
b
Emo t ions

19

.54

Allergyb

19

.54

contact lenses

16

.46

Fatigueb

14

.40

A coldb

12

.34

Eye trauma

10

.29

Eye illness (e.g., infection)

8

.23

Eye strainb

8

.23

Illness (other)

6

.17

5

.14

4

.11

Liquid irritants
(e.g., chlorinated water)
Drugs/alcoholb

a N• 35.

bA perceived cause that is identified with at

least one other symptom.
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Table 4
~

Perceived Causes for

~

Congested Nose

category of
Perceived Cause

Relative
Frequencya

Frequency

A coldb

34

.97

Allergyb

18

.51

weather (e.g., dry air, cold)b 10

.29

Flub

8

.23

crying/worrying

7

.20

6

.17

Drugs/alcoholb

4

.11

Foreign object in nose

4

.11

Covered or blocked nostrils

4

.11

Fatigueb

2

.06

2

.06

Respiratory problem
(e.g., sinusitus)

Not caring for oneself
properly (e.g., not
dressing for the weather)b

aN• 35.

bA perceived cause that is identified with at

least one other symptom.
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Table 5
The Perceived Causes for an Upset Stomach

Category of
Perceived cause

Relative
Frequencya

Frequency

Eating/drinking too much

29

.83

Junk/spicy food

19

.54

Emotional distressb

19

.54

Spoiled/bad food

17

.49

Not eating

15

.43

Flub

14

.40

Gic illness (e.g., ulcer)

10

.29

Stressb

10

.29

7

.20

(e.g., indigestion)

7

.20

Illness other than Gib

6

.17

Menstruation

4

.11

Bad odors

3

.09

Punched in the stomach

2

.06

Overexertion/activityb
Gastrointestinal irregularity

aN• 35.

bA perceived cause that is identified with at

least one other symptom.

cGastrointestinal.
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Table 6
The Perceived Causes for

~

Sore Throat

Category of

Relative

Perceived Cause

Frequencya

Frequency

A coldb

25

.71

Infection (e.g., tonsillitis)

21

.60

vocal Strain

19

.54

18

.51

Illness (other)b

11

.31

Cold/rainy weatherb

11

.31

7

.20

Poor diet

6

.17

Emotionsb

4

.11

Allergyb

3

.09

Fatigueb

2

.06

Throat irritation
(e.g., hot foods)

Not caring for oneself properly
(e.g., not

dressing for the

weather)b

a N• 35.

bA perceived cause that is identified with at

least one other symptom.

1gure 1. Proportion of Subjects in the First Eleven
Categories of Perceived Causes in Tables 2-6
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third, etc.).

This refers to the order of the first

eleven causes as they are listed in Tables 2-6.
the plots in Figure 1 show a comparable pattern.

Most of
However,

the plot for a congested nose shows that almost everyone
mentioned the first cause (a cold) and that the proportions of subjects mentioning subsequent causes are notably
lower than that of the other symptoms.

This indicates

that some symptoms are associated with a major or predominant cause.

It is not clear why this happens, but it

might be related to peoples' limited experience with
certain symptoms or to the fact that some symptoms have a
limited number of real causes.
The third basic finding is that Tables 2 through 6
show that a substantial proportion of the perceived causes
are shared, to some degree, among the five symptoms.

On

average, it was found that 59% of the perceived causes for
any one symptom were identified with at least one other
symptom.

For example, stress was mentioned as a possible

cause for a headache as well as an upset stomach.

An

allergy was identified as a potential cause for a headache, sore throat, watery eyes, and a congested nose.

In

all, there were 13 perceived causes that were associated
with two or more symptoms; these were stress, fatigue,
emotions, alcohol/drugs, hot/cold weather, an allergy,
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flu, an "illness," a cold, not caring for oneself
properly, overexertion, eyestrain, and fumes/smoke.
Dimensionality of perceived causes.

Table 7

displays the frequency distributions of the dimensions of
locus, stability, and controllability for the perceived
causes of all five symptoms.

For this table, however, it

should be noted that only single occurrences of a cause
were used for analysis.

As such, the 13 symptom attri-

butions that are mentioned above were accounted for only
once.

Thus of the 64 perceived causes that are listed in

Tables 2 through 6, only 39 were used for the analyses in
Table 7 (i.e., 25 causes were second, third, or fourth
occurrences).

Hence, the analyses examined the causal

dimensions for a set of unique perceived causes.
Overall, the chi-square analyses indicate that
subjects identified causes that are predominately
internal, unstable, and controllable.

This means that

there was a tendency to think of relatively harmless or
manageable types of causes for the symptoms that were
presented.

Tables 2 through 6 show that many of the

listings are common, everyday types of events or
occurrences.
Among the three causal dimensions, locus and
controllability showed the least response tendency.

The
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Table 7
Frequency Distributions of the Dimensions of Locus,
stability, and Controllability for the Perceived
causes of the Five Symptoms in Study !

Relative
Dimension

Frequency

Frequency

Chi-Square
Value

p

4.333

.0374

18.692

<. 0001

5.769

.0163

Locus
External

13

.33

Internal

26

.66

6

.15

33

.85

Controllable

27

.69

uncontrollable

12

.31

Stability
Stable
Unstable

controllability

Note:

For each analysis, df• 1 and N• 39.

The null

hypothesis for these and other one-way chi-square
analyses was that category frequencies were statistically equivalent.
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ratio of internal:external and controllable:uncontrollable
perceived causes were 2:1 and 2.25:1, respectively.

In

contrast, however, the ratio of unstable:stable perceived
causes was 5.5:1.

These results indicate that subjects

showed a response tendency on all three causal dimensions,
but it was substantially more pronounced for the dimension
of stability.

Enumeration as ! Function of Symptom

~

(Question £1_

The results of the repeated measures analysis of
variance and post-hoc test on the enumeration data are
displayed in Table

a.a

The ANOVA suggests that the mean

enumeration scores for an upset stomach, watery eyes, and
headache are equivalent.

Subjects provided statistically

lower enumeration scores for a congested nose and sore
throat.

Explaining Enumeration Variance (Question

11

The results of the linear multiple regression
analyses on the enumeration scores for the five symptoms
are depicted in Tables 9 through

la.

It should be noted

that the analysis for each symptom occupies two tables in
order to account for the two steps of the hierarchical
multiple regression.

For example, the results of the
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Table 8
ANOVA Summary Table and Post-Hoc Analysis of the Mean
Enumeration Scores for the Five Symptoms in Study

!

source of
SS

variation

DF

MS

Symptom Type

223.337

4

55.834

Within Cell

351.863

136

2.587

Congested

Sore

Upset

Watery

Nose

Throat

Stomach

Eyes

3.37a
(1.63)

p

F

4.46

5.83

5.91

(2.21)

(2.33)

( 2. 42)

21.581

<.0005

Headache

( 2. 03)

aThe means and (standard deviations) of the enumeration
scores.

bThe means of the underlined symptoms do not

differ statistically.
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Table 9
step

!

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for a Headache
---------------------------~-----------------------------

MULTIPLE R

.378

R2

.143

ADJUSTED R2

.029
2.005

STANDARD ERROR

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

DF

SS

MS

F

p

4

20.091

5.023

1. 250

.3114

30

120.594

4.020

---------------

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

1. 519

.934

.286

1. 626

.1144

GN

.876

.760

.197

1.153

.2582

RA

.174

.727

.041

.239

.8125

AGE

-.089

.313

-.049

-.285

.7780

(A)

6.226

6.073

1. 025

.3134

HPS
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Table 10
step

~

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for a Headache

MULTIPLE R

.534

R2

.285

ADJUSTED R2

.162

STANDARD ERROR

2
R CHANGE

.142

1.863

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

DF

SS

MS

F

p

5

40.087

8.017

2.311

.0696

29

100.599

3.469

---------------

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

HPS

.809

.917

.152

.882

.3851

GN

.787

.707

.177

1.113

.2749

RA

.087

.676

.021

.129

.8981

-.010

.293

-.005

-.033

.9735

.488

.203

.406

2.401

.0230

2.704

5.829

.464

.6461

AGE
MEANa
(A)

aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than
headache.

68
Table 11
step

!

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for Watery Eyes

MULTIPLE R

.482

R2

.232

ADJUSTED R2

.130

STANDARD ERROR

2.255

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

DF

SS

MS

F

p

4

46.161

11.540

2.269

.0851

30

152.582

5.086

___ ___________
.....,.

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

---------------

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

2.558

1.051

.405

2.434

.0211

GN

.647

.855

.123

.756

.4554

RA

.490

.817

.098

.599

.5534

AGE

-.291

.353

-.135

-.826

.4151

(A)

9.423

6.831

1.380

.1779

VARIABLE
HPS
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Table 12
SteE

~

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for Watery Eyes

MULTIPLE R

.728

R2

.530

ADJUSTED R2

.449

STANDARD ERROR

2
R CHANGE

.298

1.794

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

OF

SS

MS

F

p

5

105.368

21.074

6.545

.0003

29

93.375

3.220

---------------

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

1.460

.874

.231

1.670

.1058

GN

.426

.682

.081

.624

.5372

RA

.400

.651

.080

.614

.5438

-.188

.282

-.087

-.669

.5087

.919

.214

.580

4.288

.0002

3.530

5.606

.630

.5339

HPS

AGE
MEANa
(A)

aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than
watery eyes.
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Table 13
step

!

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for

~

Congested Nose

MULTIPLE R

.289

R2

.084

ADJUSTED R

2

-.039
1. 660

STANDARD ERROR

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

DF

SS

MS

F

p

4

7.516

1. 879

.682

.6099

30

82.655

2.755

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

---------------

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

HPS

1. 045

.773

.245

1. 351

.1868

GN

-.221

.629

-.062

-.351

.7277

RA

-.295

.602

-.087

-.491

.6269

AGE

.198

.260

.136

.763

.4513

(A)

.110

5.027

.022

.9827
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Table 14
Step

~

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for

~

Congested Nose

MULTIPLE R

.637

R2

.406

ADJUSTED R2

.303

STANDARD ERROR

R

2

CHANGE

.322

1. 360

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

OF

SS

MS

F

p

5

36.571

7.314

3.957

.0074

29

53.600

1. 848

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

.110

.676

.026

.163

.8718

GN

-.493

.520

-.139

-.948

.3512

RA

-.470

.495

-.139

-.951

.3494

AGE

.337

.215

.232

1.566

.1282

MEANa

.594

.150

.631

3.965

.0004

-5.085

4.321

-1.177

.2488

HPS

(A)

---------------

aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than
congested nose.
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Table 15
step

!

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for an Upset Stomach

MULTIPLE R

.408

R2

.166

ADJUSTED R

2

.055

STANDARD ERROR

2.267

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

DF

SS

MS

F

p

4

30.784

7.696

1.497

.2279

30

154.187

5.140

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

1.672

1. 056

.274

1.583

.1239

GN

.429

.860

.084

.498

.6218

RA

.769

.822

.159

.936

.3569

AGE

-.414

.354

-.199

-1.167

.2522

(A)

11. 940

6.867

1. 739

.0923

HPS

---------------
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Table 16
step

~

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for an Upset Stomach

MULTIPLE R

.589

R2

.347

2
ADJUSTED R

.234

STANDARD ERROR

R2 CHANGE

.180

2.041

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

DF

SS

MS

F

p

5

64.131

12.826

3.078

.0239

29

120.841

4.167

---------------

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

HPS

.740

1. 007

.121

.735

.4684

GN

.235

.777

.046

.302

.7649

RA

.750

.740

.155

1. 014

.3191

-.360

.320

- .173

-1.127

.2692

.658

.233

.457

2.829

.0084

8.131

6.328

1. 285

.2090

AGE
MEANa
(A)

aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than upset
stomach.

74
Table 17
step

!

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for !

Sore Throat

MULTIPLE R

.145

R2

.021

ADJUSTED R

2

-.109

STANDARD ERROR

2.332

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

OF

SS

MS

F

p

4

3.518

.879

.162

.9561

30

163.168

5.439

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

.545

1. 087

.094

.502

.6193

GN

-.123

.884

-.025

-.139

.8904

RA

-.254

.845

-.055

-.301

.7658

AGE

-.143

.365

-.073

-.393

.6967

(A)

7.389

7.064

1. 046

.3039

HPS

---------------
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Table 18
Step

~

of the Multiple Regression Analysis of the

Enumeration Scores for a Sore Throat

MULTIPLE R

.733

R2

.537

ADJUSTED R2

.457

STANDARD ERROR

2
R CHANGE

.516

1. 631

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR REGRESSION

REGRESSION
RESIDUAL

DF

SS

MS

F

p

5

89.547

17.909

6.733

.0003

29

77.139

2.660

---------------

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE

B

SE B

BETA

T

p

HPS

-1.416

.834

-.245

-1.697

.1005

GN

-.623

.625

-.129

-.997

.3272

RA

-.582

.594

-.127

-.981

.3349

.029

.257

.015

.112

.9118

MEANa

1.155

.203

.818

(A)

-.608

5.136

AGE

---------------

5.687 <. 0001
-.118

.9066

aMean of enumeration scores for symptoms other than sore
throat.
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first and second steps of the regression analysis for
headache enumeration scores are displayed in Tables 9 and
10, respectively.
Abbreviations used in the analyses.

The regression

tables contain abbreviations for almost all variable names
in order to maximize use of the available page space.
Only the age variable is\ listed without brevity.

The

dichotomous variables that describe subjects are: health
professions student status (HPS), gender (GN), and racial
affiliation (RA).

The average of the enumeration scores

for symptoms other than the one in the analysis is
represented by the term "MEAN."

Finally, the paren-

thetical expression "(A)" represents the intercept of the
regression line.
Variance

explained~

demographic variables.

The

variance in enumeration scores that is attributable only
to demographic characteristics is displayed in Tables 9,
11, 13, 15, and 17.

These tables contain the results of

the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression
analysis for all of the five symptoms.
The analysis of variance for regression for four of
the five symptoms suggest that the demographic variables
did not account for a significant proportion of the variance in enumeration.

Only the analysis for the symptom of
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watery eyes rendered an

!

ratio that approached statis-

tical significance (see Table 11).

Subjects who were

enrolled in a health professions curriculum tended to
think of a few more possible causes for this symptom.
These results were also examined from the perspective of the information that is carried by the squared
multiple regression coefficients.

When the

R

2 's for all

five symptoms were averaged, it was found that the
demographic variables accounted for about 13% of the
variance in enumeration.

Although this appears appre-

ciable, it should be noted that the average adjusted R

2

2
(which eliminates the incidental inflation of R ) was
reduced to 4%.

This coincides with the analysis of

variance for regression findings that are described above.
Thus overall, the results suggest that the demographic
variables did not account for any meaningful variance in
enumeration.
Variance explained

,ey

other symptoms.

The variance

in the enumeration scores for one symptom that is
attributable to both demographic variables and the
enumeration scores of other symptoms is displayed in
Tables 10, 12, 14, 16, and 18.

These tables contain the

results of the second step of the hierarchical multiple
regression analysis for all of the five symptoms.

78

In the upper right hand corner of each table, the
change in R2 from the first to the second step of the
analysis is presented.

The test of the statistical

significance of the increase in explained variance between
the steps is presented in the regression table as the
t-test for the MEAN variable.
This information is important because it describes
the proportion of variance in the enumeration scores for
one symptom that is uniquely attributable to the
enumeration scores of the other symptoms.

For example,

Table 14 shows that adding the "MEAN" variable to the
regression equation explained an additional 32% of the
variance in enumeration scores for a congested nose.

This

is 32% of the variance that is explained after considering
the variance that is attributable to demographic
characteristics.
To collectively examine the increase in explained
variance for all of the five symptoms, the differences in
adjusted R21 s for Tables 9 through 18 were computed
(i.e., Step 2 - Step 1) and averaged.

overall, it was

found that 28% of the variance in the enumeration scores
for any one symptom was uniquely attributable to the
average of the enumeration scores for the other symptoms.
Moreover, the increases in explained variance for all of
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the five symptoms were statistically reliable beyond the
.OS level of significance.

These results indicate that

the extent to which subjects could generate perceived
causes for one symptom was related to their tendency to do
so for other symptoms.
Following each of the multiple regressions, a
residuals analysis was conducted in order to examine the
appropriateness of the linearity assumption.

In each

case, it was found that the scatterplot of the predicted
and residual scores showed no discernible pattern.
Moreover, normal probability plots indicated that the
residuals possessed an underlying normal distribution.
Given these findings, it was felt that the assumption of
linearity was not violated.

DISCUSSION FOR STUDY 1

The task that was completed by the participants of
Study 1 was simple, yet there are a number of conclusions
that can be made about the naive diagnostician.

Each of

these is discussed below.

MULTIPLE CAUSES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A SYMPTOM.
One of the initial findings of Study 1 was that
subjects were able to generate a number of perceived
causes for each of the five symptoms.

This is in line

with Kelley's (1972, 1973) causal schema theory.
Specifically, the results are consistent with the notion
of multiple sufficient causes.

When considering a

particular symptom, subjects were able to think about a
number of perceived causes -- each one of which would be
sufficient to account for the symptom.
In addition to this, it was found that some of the
causes were mentioned by almost everyone, while others
were mentioned by only a few.

This finding could be

explained in terms of Tversky and Kahneman's (1973, 1974)
availability heuristic.

It is possible that the perceived

causes that were mentioned by most of the subjects were
80

81
those that were commonly and more easily called to mind.
Thus, it seems that stress was an easily available cause
for a headache, and a cold was an easily available cause
for a congested nose.
It would be interesting to see how another group of
similar subjects would respond if they were given Tables 2
through 6 and were asked to check the perceived causes
that they thought could account for the respective
symptoms.

If it were found that most of the subjects

checked most of the causes, it would lend support for the
availability heuristic hypothesis.

In other words, this

would suggest that when individuals are not required to
"think up" causes for a symptom, they are not influenced
by the likelihood of certain causes coming to mind.
When people actually diagnose themselves do they
think about an array (i.e., a "laundry list") of potential
causes for their symptom or do they focus upon a few major
possibilities?

In either case, do individuals think of

the most available causes first or do they make an
attribution that is aided by existing information such as
situational cues?
Although the present study cannot answer these
questions directly, it seems reasonable to think that
people do not typically embark upon a "laundry list" or
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algorithmic type of strategy when making a symptom
attribution.

Such an approach would require considerable

time and cognitive effort.

Moreover, it should not be

forgotten that the results of the Cameron and Leventhal
(1988) study suggest that situational cues are important
when ascribing causes to symptoms.

If their findings are

indicative of what happens in a larger context, there is
some data that suggests that people do not use an
algorithmic strategy when diagnosing their symptoms.
Rather, it seems they are influenced to think about a
cause that is related to situational (or other relevant)
information.
Clearly, there are no definitive statements that can
be made about this matter at present.

However, if

situational cues are important for ascribing causes to
symptoms, it would appear that the availability heuristic
does not play a central role in self-diagnosis.

It is

reasonable to expect that the heuristic would influence
peoples' attributions if they had to independently "come
up with" a cause for a symptom.

But if attributions are

guided by cues, then individuals could well be stimulated
into thinking about causes which, by themselves, might or
might not be easily called to mind.
If the availability heuristic was operating in Study
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1, it might have been related to the experimental task.
After all, subjects were asked to think about the causes
for hypothetical symptoms, they were not actively engaged
in the process of self-diagnosis.

THE NAIVE DIAGNOSTICIAN THINKS OF GENERAL CAUSES.

One of the findings from this study is that some of
the perceived causes were associated with a majority of
the symptoms.

In some cases, these causes appear to be

related to the cluster of symptoms that were presented.
For example, it is easy to see why subjects reported that
a cold and an allergy can be causes for a headache, sore
throat, watery eyes, and a congested nose.

In fact, this

is indicative of what Bishop and Converse (1986) have
termed illness prototypes.

It is likely that this

particular group of symptoms are prototypical of a cold or
an allergy.

It is odd, however, that subjects also

reported that fatigue was a potential cause for the same
symptoms.

It is doubtful that a headache, sore throat,

watery eyes, and a congested nose are prototypical of
fatigue.
There were four other perceived causes that were
identified with three or four symptoms each; these were
emotions (distress), alcohol/drugs, hot/cold weather, and
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an illness.

Although this finding is not well established

at this point, it nonetheless suggests the interesting
idea that the naive diagnostician thinks of general
causes.

In other words, there are some causes that can

account for a variety of seemingly unrelated symptoms.

If

this is true, individuals would almost always be able to
relate their symptom to some cause, even in the absence of
contextual cues.

General causes could help individuals

"think of something" at those times when it is difficult
to make a symptom attribution.
The invocation of general causes can be seen in
people who live near a toxic waste site.

Once they

realize that the air or water has been polluted there is a
tendency to attribute a variety of symptoms to the
presence of the noxious substance.

In reality, this might

be the cause of some symptoms, but the tendency is to
attribute this cause to almost every symptom.
The concept of general causes can provide insight
into a collective behavior that is known as hysterical
contagion or mass psychogenic illness.

This refers to the

spreading of a symptom to a group of individuals for which
no physical explanation can be found (Colligan, Pennebaker, & Murphy, 1982; Kerckhoff & Back, 1968; Skelton &
Pennebaker, 1982).
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In a book entitled The June Bug, Kerckhoff and Back
(1968) describe a textile company that was forced to close
when 40 out of 200 employees in a sewing room became ill,
some of whom were hospitalized.

The affected workers

complained of symptoms such as dizziness, nausea, and
profuse sweating.

Ultimately, 62 out of a total of 965

employees became ill.

During this time there was a rumor

in the factory indicating that these problems were being
caused by invisible bugs that had arrived in a shipment of
raw materials imported from South America.

The authors

found that individuals believed that the bugs were to
blame for their symptoms, despite the fact that there was
no confirming evidence.
Following a complex analysis of this case, Kerckhoff
and Back (1968) concluded that peoples' symptoms were
caused by tension and job stress.

From the workers per-

spective, however, it is possible that the "bugs" became a
general cause, thus having the capability to account for
most any symptom that was experienced.

If the workers did

not have the capacity to form general causes, the hysterical contagion might not have occurred.
Although the experience with day-to-day symptoms is
typically not this extreme, general causes can still play
a significant role.

For example, someone who is unable to

86

think of a reason for his or her headache can easily blame
stress, the weather, or fatigue.

These factors are

pervasive in one's life and can be readily drawn upon to
account for a variety of symptomatic experiences.

The

concept of general causes is an intriguing idea, one that
is deserving of serious research and development.

INDIVIDUALS THINK OF INNOCUOUS OR MANAGEABLE CAUSES FOR
SYMPTOMS.

The results of Study 1 have shown that subjects
tended to make attributions that were harmless (e.g., a
cold) or manageable by a lay person given some degree of
effort (e.g., hot/cold weather).

In all, perceived causes

were found to be predominately internal, controllable, and
unstable in nature.
There are three explanations for this finding.
First, it should not be forgotten that the subjects in
this study are young and relatively healthy.

Many of

their symptoms have actually been caused by harmless and
manageable influences.

Because the five symptoms of Study

1 are typical of those experienced by college students, it
is possible that subjects thought of the causes that are
typical of their experience.
In a related way, subjects might have thought of
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simplistic types of causes because they were asked to
respond to simplistic types of symptoms.

Perhaps

responses would have been different if the symptoms were
of greater intensity, such as a severe headache or a
piercing abdominal pain.

If so, it would suggest that

self-diagnosis is, in part, a function of symptom
severity.
The fact that subjects identified innocuous and
manageable causes might also be explained in terms of a
motivational bias.

It is possible that when making a

symptom attribution there is an automatic tendency to
think of simple, non-threatening types of causes.

In this

way, individuals protect themselves from personal threat.
This idea is consistent with other investigators who have
argued that people exhibit a tendency to discount the
importance or seriousness of their symptomatic experiences
(e.g., see Ditto et al., 1988; Green et al., 1974).

SYMPTOM ENUMERATION IS RELATED TO SYMPTOM TYPE.
Analyses from Study 1 showed that enumeration scores
varied as a function of symptom type.

The fact that

individuals can think of more causes for some symptoms and
less for others might be related to their experience.
was noted earlier that some symptoms are more commonly

It
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experienced and are more frequently the focus of media
attention.

Other symptoms are less frequently experienced

and discussed.
It is interesting, however, to consider how
enumeration influences the information processing aspects
of making a symptom attribution.

For example, if self-

diagnoses are made independently of situational cues, it
seems likely that the time it would take to make an
attribution as well as the confidence that one would have
in that attribution is a function of enumeration.

In

other words, it would take longer to make a symptom
attribution if there were many perceived causes to consider.

Likewise, someone probably would be less sure of

his or her attribution because there is a variety of
causes that can explain the symptom.
If, however, cues guide the selection of causes, it
is possible that enumeration plays a small role in the
process of choosing a cause.

This is because situational

cues (or other relevant information) would provide the
individual with a guess or a hunch about the cause that is
at work.

Hence, it would make no difference if there were

few or many causes to explain a symptom -- the cue would
implicate some particular cause.
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SYMPTOM ENUMERATION MIGHT BE AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE
VARIABLE.
It was interesting to find that the enumeration
score for each symptom was positively and reliably
correlated with the average of the enumeration scores of
the other symptoms.

One interpretation of this finding is

that enumeration is an individual difference variable.
This would suggest that some people have the tendency to
think of more causes for symptoms while others tend to
think of less.

For lack of a better label, these indi-

viduals can be said to be high and low on the construct of
symptom enumeration.
As an individual difference variable, symptom
enumeration could affect self-diagnosis in two distinct
ways.

First, it might influence one's tendency to make a

symptom attribution.

In other words, high enumerators

might be prone to self-diagnose, even when a symptom is
minor and fleeting.

And low enumerators might not think

of a cause for a symptom, despite the fact that it might
last for a considerable period of time.

Second, enumer-

ation could influence one's ability to make a symptom
reattribution.

When confronted with the fact that one's

symptom attribution might be incorrect, high enumerators
would be better equipped to bring some other cause to mind
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so that another attribution can be made.

Conclusion
In summary, then, it can be seen that Study 1 has
provided an array of interesting results, some of which
have nurtured the discussion of general causes and symptom
enumeration as an individual difference variable.

More

importantly, the study has raised just as many questions
as it has answered.

From this work it is clear that

future research needs to examine the role of situational
cues, the influence of the availability heuristic,
motivational biases and much more.

To do this, however,

investigators will need to study people as they make
attributions for real symptoms.
Study 2.

This is the focus of

METHOD FOR STUDY 2

subjects
The subjects for this study were 105 introductory
psychology students who received course credit for their
participation.

An additional 10 subjects were recruited

from other psychology courses by means of a flier that
asked for volunteers.
The demographic characteristics of all individuals
are displayed in Table 19.

Similar to Study 1, subjects

were predominately female, Caucasian, freshmen who were
enrolled in non-health oriented curricula.

There were

seven individuals who were trained health professionals
(all were nurses).

The mean age of subjects was 19.66

years (SD• 2.76).
Overall, the subjects from Studies 1 and 2 were
quite similar.

A comparison of characteristics showed

that there were no reliable differences in the relative
distributions of gender,

x2

(1, ~= 148)= 2.17, £= .141;

racial background, ! 2 (1, ~-148)= 1.22, £• .269; student
rank, ! 2 (2, ~= 148)= 4.61, £= .10; and trained health
professionals ! 2 (1, ~- 148)• 2.97, E•.085.

However, the

subjects in Study 2 were slightly older (19.66 vs. 18.46),
91
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Table 19
Demographic Characteristics of the Subjects in Study

~

------------------------------------------------------Relative
characteristic

Frequencya

Frequency

Gender
Male

48

.43

Female

65

.57

Caucasian

85

.75

Black

10

.09

Hispanic

9

.08

Oriental / Asian

8

.27

Other

1

.01

Freshman

66

.59

Sophomore

29

.26

Junior

5

.04

Senior

3

.03

10

.08

Racial Affiliation

student Rank

Other

(table continues)
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Relative
Characteristic

Frequency

Frequency

7

.06

106

.94

9

.08

104

.92

Curriculum
Health Professions
Other
Health Professional
Yes
No

Note: The data from two subjects are missing.
aN•ll3.
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!(146)= 2.50, E< .02.

They also had a smaller percentage

of individuals (6% vs. 17%) who were enrolled in a health
professions curriculum, ~ 2 (1, N• 148)- 4.00, E< .05.

Instruments
The subjects of Study 2 were interviewed with the
Symptom Attribution Survey (see Appendix B).

This

instrument was developed for use in the present study and
was designed to document a sampling of the cognitions,
perceptions, and behaviors of individuals who have thought
about the causes for a recent physical symptom.

A handout

that was used with the survey is located in Appendix C.
Subjects were also required to complete the Health
Opinion Survey (Krantz, Baum, & Wideman, 1980), the
Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic Languidness (known as the
PILL) (Pennebaker, 1982), and the Body Consciousness
Questionnaire (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981).

These are

paper and pencil instruments that assess individual
differences on: (1) the preference for information and
behavioral involvement in health care, (2) the tendency to
experience symptoms, and (3) the public and private
aspects of body awareness, respectively.

Copies of these

instruments are in Appendices D, E, and F.
These paper and pencil instruments were chosen for
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this study because they assess health related individual
differences that could reasonably influence symptom
attribution processes.

In addition, the instruments were

normed on college students and are designed to address
routine aspects of health and symptomatology.

This was

considered most appropriate for the subjects in this
study.
Symptom attribution survey.

At the beginning of

this interview, respondents were asked a few questions
about the nature of their symptomatic experience.

For

example, they were asked to identify their symptom and
describe how uncomfortable it was, how long it lasted, and
how serious it appeared to be.

After this, the

respondents were asked to list all of the possible causes
that could account for a symptom like the one they had
experienced.
At that point, subjects were asked to identify the
first cause that came to mind when they experienced their
symptom.

They were then asked questions regarding

information that was acquired from the qualities of the
symptom, the outcomes of self-treatment, the interactions
with friends or other lay consultants, visits with health
professionals, and medical guides.

Respondents were asked

to freely describe what it was that led them to think
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about their attribution.

They were also asked to freely

describe anything that might have informed them that their
attribution was wrong.

Some of these questions are

discussed in more detail later.
If the respondent mentioned that he or she thought
about more than one cause during the course of the
symptom, the same set of questions was repeated.

The

interview was designed to ask these questions for up to
three perceived causes (i.e., an initial attribution and
two reattributions).

Only the number and type of

attributions were recorded after that point.

Many of the

analyses for Study 2 were conducted as a function of the
three attributions.

For the remainder of this work, these

are referred to as the primary, secondary, and tertiary
attributions.
Health Opinion Survey.

This survey is a 16 item

instrument that asks respondents to agree or disagree with
a series of statements that address the desire for health
related information and the interest in being involved
with one's own health care.
scores are generated.

From this, two subscale

Krantz et al. (1980) have reported

that the behavior and information subscales have internal
consistency measures of .74 and .76, respectively.

In

addition, test-retest reliabilities over a seven week
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period have been measured at .71 and .59, respectively.
Both the subscale and total scores from the Health
Opinion Survey have demonstrated low to moderate correlations (average r• .27) with the Health Locus of Control
Scale (cf. Wallston & Wallston, 1982; Wallston, Wallston,
Kaplan, & Maides, 1976), and a very low correlation
(average r• .08) with social desirability (cf. Crowne &
Marlowe, 1964).

More importantly, Krantz et al. (1980)

have shown that college students who scored high on the
behavior subscale showed a greater tendency to make a
self-diagnosis in response to a recent physical symptom.
Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic Languidness. The PILL
is a 54 item instrument that presents the respondent with
a wide variety of common symptoms.

Each symptom is rated

on a 5-point time continuum that measures the frequency
with which the symptom is experienced.
generated from this instrument.

One score is

Pennebaker (1982) has

reported that the internal consistency of the PILL is .88,
and that the test-retest reliability across a two month
period is .79.

Unlike other medical checklists, such as

the Cornell Medical Index, the PILL focuses upon common
symptoms.
Body Consciousness Questionnaire. This instrument
contains 15 statements that reflect the perceptions of
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one's body.

The task of the respondent is to rate each

statement in terms of how characteristic it is of his or
her own perception.

The instrument renders three subscale

scores; these are private body consciousness (i.e., the
awareness of internal sensations), public body consciousness (i.e., concern about the outward appearance of one's
body), and body competence (i.e., the belief in the
adequacy of one's body).
Miller et al.

(1981) have reported that the

test-retest reliabilities for the three subscales, in
order, are .69, .73, and .83 over a two month period.
Moreover, the authors have noted that private body
consciousness correlated more strongly with private
self-consciousness than it did with public selfconsciousness.

The reverse of this was found with public

body consciousness (cf. Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,
1975).

Procedure
Subjects were invited to volunteer for Study 2 if
they had experienced a physical symptom sometime in the
previous three to four weeks. They were asked not to
volunteer if they had participated in Study 1.

On their

initial contact with the investigator, each subject was
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asked to complete a demographic information sheet.
Following this, the investigator read the introduction of
the Symptom Attribution Survey, and then conducted the
interview with the subject. 9 Before departing, subjects
were informed that they would be receiving a few questionnaires in the mail.

All were informed that full credit

for participation in the study was contingent upon
returning the questionnaires in the post-paid return
envelopes.
Approximately three to five days after the interview, the investigator mailed the self-report instruments.
In a cover letter, subjects were informed that everything
should be returned within five days and that the forms
should be completed in the order that they were received.
This was important because the instruments were put in
random order to control for presentation effects.
The time interval between tasks was implemented to
minimize fatigue (the interview averaged 32.8 minutes),
and subject reactivity.

During pilot interviews it was

noted that some respondents had been concerned about their
causal analysis.

For example, some people prefaced their

answers with qualifiers such as "I know this won't seem
very scientific, but ... "

It was felt that if the survey

created a reactivity, some subjects might want to appear
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more rational on the self-report instruments, thus biasing
the results.
Counterbalancing the tasks between subjects would
have been a desirable method for controlling the effects
of task presentation (cf. Underwood, 1966).

In this case,

half of the subjects would complete the interview followed
by the self-report instruments, while the other half would
do this in reverse order.

This, however, would require

half of the subjects to postpone the symptom interview.
It was felt that Study 2 was already relying enough upon
subjects' recollections of a common event.

To delay the

interview would probably make recall more difficult and
prone to additional error. 10

Research Questions and Data Analysis
There were nine main questions that guided the data
analysis for Study 2.

These questions are listed below

with the procedures that were used to answer them.

Question 1: WHAT TYPES OF SYMPTOMS DID SUBJECTS
EXPERIENCE?

To answer this question, verbal reports of symptoms
were categorized and tallied.

These categories were then

organized into higher "systems-oriented" classes.

This

101
was done to provide greater structure in reporting the
variety of symptoms that was experienced.

Question 2: HOW MANY SUBJECTS MADE A SYMPTOM ATTRIBUTION,
AND WHAT TYPES OF ATTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE?
Making an attribution.

Attribution researchers such

as Hastie (1974), Lau and Russel (1980), Pyzczynski and
Greenberg (1981), and Wong and Weiner (1981} have shown
how attributional processes are triggered by unexpected
events.

Physical symptoms can be viewed as unexpected in

that they sometimes occur suddenly, and almost always
disrupt the way one feels or performs routine activities.
In this sense, it would be expected that most individuals
make an attribution in response to a symptom.
The number of subjects who made no symptom attribution and those who made at least one attribution were
tallied and compared with a one-way chi-square test.

It

was expected that most of the subjects made at least one
attribution for their symptom.
Types of attributions.

Using definitions from Study

1, subjects' primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions
were classified with the dimensions of locus, stability,
and controllability.

The occurrences of the levels of

these dimensions were then tallied and compared with
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one-way chi-square tests.
When presented with hypothetical, innocuous types of
symptoms, the subjects in Study 1 identified causes that
were primarily internal, unstable and controllable. If
individuals apply the same attribution processes with real
symptoms, it would be expected that similar results would
be found with Study 2.

Question 3: WHAT EXPLAINS THE VARIANCE IN ATTRIBUTIONAL
EFFORT?

In this study, attributional effort was conceptualized as the degree to which someone tried to diagnose
his or her symptom.

This was operationally defined as the

number of attributions that were made.
The importance of question 3 is based in the fact
that many of the analyses for Study 2 were designed to
examine cognitions or behaviors as they occurred from the
primary to the tertiary attribution.

It was thought that

attributional effort might be related to factors such as
the type or quality of one's symptom or health related
individual differences.

For example, subjects with a

minor symptom might not need to go beyond a primary
attribution, while those with a more serious or uncomfortable one might be led to make secondary and tertiary

103
attributions.

Likewise, individuals who score high on the

construct of private body consciousness might be inclined
to make more attributions than those who score low.

It

would be important to be aware of these factors so that
they could be used in the interpretation of other
analyses.
To explain the variance in attributional effort, a
hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was
conducted.

The analysis was organized into four steps.

On step 1, eight dummy coded variables representing
symptom type were entered into the equation.

On step 2,

five variables that depict symptom characteristics were
entered.

These were: duration of the symptom, perceived

discomfort, perceived seriousness, and two dichotomous
variables that measured whether or not the symptom was
previously experienced by the subject and whether or not
it interfered with routine activities.

On step 3, a

single dichotomous variable was entered.

This was called

attributional response, and represented the time at which
one's initial attribution was made (i.e., at the time the
symptom appeared or some time later).

On Step 4, health-

related individual difference variables were entered.
These were: private body consciousness, the information
and behavior subscales of the Health Opinion Survey, and
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the PILL.

A symptom enumeration score was also entered on
this step. 11
Attributional response was selected because it was
viewed as a proxy measure of the need to self-diagnose,
that is, the need to know the cause of one's symptom.
The selection of this variable was not based upon prior
research.

Rather, it was a reasonable assumption that if

the need to self-diagnose were high, one would begin
attributional reasoning at the time of symptom onset.

If

the need were low, one might not be concerned about an
attribution until later.

Given this, it seemed reasonable

to expect that attributional response would be positively
related to attributional effort.

Question 4: WHAT TYPES OF INFORMATION DID SUBJECTS USE
FOR MAKING A SYMPTOM ATTRIBUTION?

During the interview, subjects were asked to
describe the type or types of information that helped them
make a symptom attribution. Responses to this open-ended
question were examined, classified and tallied for the
primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions.

In order

to test the adequacy of the classification scheme, the
responses for the primary attribution were independently
coded by two raters.

Agreement was assessed with the
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kappa statistic (Fleiss, 1973).
Cues from the environment and from one's memory were
discussed earlier in terms of their expected value for
making symptom attributions.

In addition, the Cameron and

Leventhal (1988) study has provided empirical support for
the influence of environment cues.

Hence, it is expected

that subjects' responses to the open ended question would
reflect the importance of environment and memory cues if
they are useful in ascribing causes to symptoms.

Question 5: DID THE OUTCOMES OF SELF-TREATMENT INFLUENCE
SUBJECTS' BELIEF IN THEIR ATTRIBUTION, AND
DID THIS AFFECT THE TENDENCY TO MAKE A
REATTRIBUTION?

Belief in one's attribution.

If subjects made an

attempt at relieving their symptom, they were asked if the
outcome of that action influenced the belief in their
attribution.

Those respondents who said that their belief

was either strengthened or weakened were asked to explain
why they felt this had occurred.

Responses to this

question were examined, classified and tallied for the
primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions.

The

adequacy of the classification scheme was tested by having
two independent raters code the responses for the primary
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attribution.

Agreement was then assessed with the kappa

statistic.
Making a reattribution.

Theories of self-regulation

(e.g., see Leventhal & Hirschman, 1982; Leventhal, Nerenz,
& Strauss, 1980) show how health-related beliefs are

influenced by the outcomes of actions.

For example,

someone may take a antacid to relieve what is believed to
be a case of heartburn, only to find that the discomfort
gets worse.

As a result, the feedback from this action

might lead the individual to re-evaluate his or her
symptom attribution.

This type of feedback is similar to

the notion of expectancy/outcome incongruity which was
discussed in terms of its ability to promote attributional
processing.

Given this, it was felt that individuals

would be more inclined to make a symptom reattribution if
the belief in their original attribution was weakened
following self-treatment outcomes.

The reverse would be

expected if belief in one's original attribution was
strengthened.
To examine this hypothesis, the impact of selftreatment outcomes (i.e., the belief that one's
attribution was strengthened, weakened, or unaffected) was
cross-referenced with subsequent attribution activity
(i.e., the subject either made or did not make a subse-
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quent attribution).

The data were then analyzed with a

chi-square test for association.

Question 6: DID SUBJECTS SEE THEMSELVES AS BEING SICK,
AND DID THIS INFLUENCE THE TENDENCY TO MAKE
A REATTRIBUTION?

The perception of being sick.

The importance of

question 6 lies in the phenomenological interpretation of
the term "sick."

Although this topic has received little

attention in the psychological literature, Baumann (1961)
has shown that individuals define sickness using feeling,
symptomalogical, and performance dimensions.

In other

words, people report that being sick means that one does
not feel right, one has symptoms, and one is unable to
carry on his or her normal activities. 12 Thus, it would
appear that being sick means that one is affected by a
dispositional type of condition.

A condition that is

somewhat more than an external, fleeting influence.
Given this, it seems reasonable to assume that the
perception of being sick is susceptible to the fundamental
attribution error (Jones & Nisbett, 1972).

In other

words, there might be an automatic assumption that one's
symptoms are not indicative of an underlying illness.
this is true, individuals should typically believe that

If
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they are not sick -- at least until they exhibit the
qualities mentioned above.
Research by Campbell (1975b) supports this notion.
In his study, a sample of mothers and their children were
given a list of 13 symptoms and were asked if these would
be indicators of illness in the mother.

They were then

asked if the same symptoms would be indicators of illness
in the child.

In result, it was found that mothers were

more likely to attribute illness to their children, and
children were more likely to attribute illness to their
mothers.
To answer the first part of question 6, the number
of subjects who believed that they were sick and those who
believed that they were not sick were tallied and compared
with one-way chi-square tests.

This was done for the

primary, secondary and tertiary attributions.

Overall, it

was expected that most people would see themselves as not
being sick.
Making a reattribution.

If the perception of being

sick means that one believes him- or herself to be
affected by something other than an external, fleeting
condition, it is reasonable to assume that there will be a
resistance to change a symptom attribution.

To test this

idea, the belief in being (or not being) sick was cross-
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referenced with subsequent attribution activity.

The data

were then analyzed with a chi-square test for association.
It was expected that those who perceived themselves as
being sick would be less inclined to make a reattribution.

Question 7: DID DISCUSSIONS WITH FRIENDS OR OTHER LAY
CONSULTANTS INFLUENCE SUBJECTS' BELIEF IN
THEIR ATTRIBUTION, AND DID THIS AFFECT THE
TENDENCY TO MAKE A REATTRIBUTION?
Discussing symptoms with

~

consultants.

Medical

sociologists have been aware of "lay referral structures"
(Friedson, 1961) or "lay conferral systems" (Elder, 1968)
for nearly three decades.

These have been described as

the informal network of friends and acquaintances who
provide medically relevant information to each other.
Research findings suggest that a substantial proportion of
individuals make use of lay consultants when faced with
symptoms.

For example, Suchman (1965), Miller (1973) and

Sanders (1982) found that medically uninformed individuals
were sought by 74%, 62%, and 81% of their samples, respectively.

The work by Sanders is particularly relevant here

because it is based upon a group of college
undergraduates.
The impetus for lay conferral is thought to be based
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in social comparison processes (Sanders, 1982).

Thus, it

would be expected that the greater one's uncertainty in
the interpretation of a symptom (such as when it is
unusually intense or uncomfortable), the greater his or
her tendency will be to seek lay consultation.

Moreover,

social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954; West & Wicklund, 1980) predicts that individuals will seek people who
are most like themselves.
During the interview of Study 2, subjects were asked
if they had discussed their symptoms with a friend or
other lay consultant. 13 If so, respondents were asked to
identify this person.

In addition, they were asked if

they specifically intended to discuss the symptom, and if
the lay consultant made an attribution for their symptom
during the discussion.

If the lay consultant made a

similar attribution, the subject was asked if this made
him or her feel more confident about the attribution.

If

the lay consultant made a contrary attribution, the subject was asked if this made him or her feel less confident
about the attribution.
If the lay consultant did not make an attribution
during the discussion, the subject was asked if there was
anything said that in some way made him or her feel more
or less confident about the attribution.

Open ended
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responses were recorded for this last question.
Subjects' responses to each of the above questions
were tallied and compared with one-way chi-square tests.
This was done for the primary, secondary, and tertiary
attributions.

In addition, the open ended responses were

examined, classified and tallied.

The adequacy of the

classification scheme was tested by having two independent
raters code the responses for the primary attribution.
Agreement was then assessed with the kappa statistic.
In order to examine a motive for seeking lay
consultation, subjects' rating of perceived discomfort and
seriousness were correlated with the intent to discuss
their symptom (l• intended to discuss symptom,

o-

did not

intend to discuss symptom).
Given the subjects in this study it was expected
that most would have discussed their symptom with one or
two friends.

Although it was difficult to predict if

people intended to discuss their symptom, it was hypothesized that subjects' confidence in their attribution would
would be higher if the lay consultant made a similar
symptom attribution.

Based upon social comparison theory

it was also hypothesized that the ratings of discomfort
and seriousness would correlate positively with the intent
to discuss one's symptom.
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Making

~

reattribution.

To date, the literature

on the influence of lay referral is not consistent.

For

example, Sanders (1982) describes the value of lay
consultation for making decisions about the meaning of
symptoms.

In addition, he found that college under-

graduates reported that the advice of a lay consultant
typically has a strong directive influence on reactions to
symptoms.

The work by Miller (1973), however, found that

individuals showed equal tendencies to accept and to
reject lay advice regarding actions for cancer symptoms of
the head and neck.
To investigate the influence of lay referral on
reattribution, the strength of subjects' belief in their
attribution following the discussion with a friend (i.e.,
the belief was strengthened, weakened, or unaffected) was
cross-referenced with subsequent attribution activity.
The data were then analyzed with a chi-square test for
association.

If the belief in one's initial attribution

was weakened by the discussion, it would be expected that
individuals would tend to make a reattribution.
reverse would be expected if one's belief was
strengthened.

The
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Question 8: DID SUBJECTS RELY UPON HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
OR MEDICAL GUIDES TO HELP THEM MAKE A SYMPTOM
ATTRIBUTION?

14

Not much is known about the health care seeking
behavior of college undergraduates; however, there are
some data to suggest that they are not high consumers of
health care practice.

It was noted earlier that the

National Center for Health Statistics (1981) reported that
there were about 18.3 million office visits during 1977-78
for the primary complaint of headache.

Of that total,

only 2.5 million visits (13.6%) were made by individuals
15-24 years of age. 15

The only age group that showed a

lower percentage of office visits was that under 15 years
old.

In a similar vein, Sanders' (1982) survey of under-

graduates found that a health care professional was sought
to explain symptoms about once every 14 months.

Given

this, it was reasonable to expect that most of the
subjects in Study 2 did not seek a health professional to
aid in the diagnosis of their symptom.

Likewise, it was

expected that most did not refer to a medical guide.
To answer question 8, the number of individuals who
sought professional help for their symptom and those who
did not were tallied and compared with a one-way chisquare test.

The same was done for those who referred to
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a medical guide and those who did not.

Both sets of

analyses were conducted for the primary, secondary and
tertiary attributions.

Question 9: WHAT TYPES OF INFORMATION DID SUBJECTS
ENCOUNTER THAT CAST DOUBT UPON THEIR SYMPTOM
ATTRIBUTION, AND DID THIS AFFECT THE TENDENCY
TO MAKE A REATTRIBUTION?
Types of doubt provoking information.

During the

interview, subjects were asked if there was any information that made them think that their attribution might be
wrong.

If so, they were asked to describe what this was.

An open ended response was desired so that the survey
could assess facts that had not already been covered.
These responses were examined, classified and tallied for
the. primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions.

In

order to test the adequacy of the classification scheme,
the responses for the primary attribution were independently coded by two raters.

Agreement was then

assessed with the kappa statistic.
Persuasion and expectancy/outcome incongruity were
discussed earlier in terms of their potential influence
for stimulating a symptom reattribution.

Hence, it was

expected that subjects' open ended responses would reflect
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these influences if they are important for making a
reattribution.
Making ! reattribution.

It was expected that the

presence of doubt provoking information would stimulate a
reattribution.

In other words, people should be prone to

make a reattribution if they perceive information that
makes them think that their initial attribution might be
wrong.

To test this hypothesis, the belief that doubt

provoking information was present or absent was crossreferenced with subsequent attribution activity.
data were then analyzed with a chi-square test for
association.

These

RESULTS FOR STUDY 2

Symptoms Experienced

~

Subjects (Question

!l

The types of symptoms that were experienced by
subjects are presented in Table 20.

As it can be seen,

many of the individuals (66%) had an experience with a
headache or a variety of gastrointestinal problems.
Across all symptoms, however, subjects reported a wide
range of discomfort and perceived seriousness.
discomfort ratings ranged from 3 to 10

(~-

The

6.97, SD•

1.65), where the values of 1 and 10 indicate "very little
discomfort" and "a lot of discomfort," respectively.
Similarly, the seriousness ratings ranged from 1 to 10 (M•
4.43, SD• 2.31), where these indicate that one's symptom
was perceived to be "not very serious" and "very serious,"
respectively.

In terms of duration, the shortest symptom

lasted about one hour, while the longest lasted 22 weeks
(M• 1.52 weeks, SD• 3.26 weeks MD• 2.65 days).

16

Almost

all of the subjects (85%) said that their symptom interfered with routine activities to some extent.
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Table 20
symptoms Experienced

~

the Subjects in Study

±

Relative
Symptom Type

Headache

Frequencya

Frequency

51

.44

25

.22

10

.09

(alone or with other
symptoms)

Gastrointestinal
(stomach ache, nausea,
diarrhea, upset stomach
with and without other
symptoms, multiple
gastrointestinal symptoms)

Musculoskeletal
(muscle aches, sore back,
joint pain)

(table continues)
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Relative
symptom Type

Frequency

Upper Respiratory

Frequency

7

.06

4

.04

3

.03

Skin Rash

2

.02

Other Singular Symptoms

8

.07

Other Multiple Symptoms

5

.04

(Sore throat, cough, multiple
upper respiratory symptoms)

Genitourinary
(urinary frequency, burning)

Ear Problems
(burning, trauma)

a N• 115.
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Attributional Activity and Types of Attributions Made
~

(Question

Making an attribution.

Of the 115 subjects in this

study, 112 made at least one attribution for their
symptom,

~

2

(1, N= 115)• 103.31, £< .00005.

The mean

number of attributions was 2.09 (SD• 1.26), and 63% of the
subjects made two or more.
Types of attributions.

Tables 21, 22, and 23

display the frequency distributions of the dimensions of
locus, stability, and controllability for the primary,
secondary, and tertiary attributions.

The data show that

subjects reported causes that were predominately internal,
unstable, and controllable.

When averaged across the

three tables, the ratios of internal:external, unstable:
stable, and controllable:uncontrollable perceived causes
we~e

found to be 2.08:1, 5.64:1, and 1.77:1, respectively.
These ratios were re-computed for the 33 subjects

who made all three attributions.

This was done to insure

that the findings in Tables 21-23 were not due to the
attrition of subjects (note how N drops from 112 to 72 to
33).

When averaged across all three attributions, the

ratios were, in order, 2.48:1, 5.05:1, and 1.75:1.

The

levels of statistical significance were very similar to
those in Tables 21-23.

120
Table 21
Frequency Distributions for the Dimensions of Locus,
stability, and Controllability for Primary Attributions

Relative
Dimension

Frequency

Frequency

Chi-Square
Value

LOCUS

Internal

76

.68

External

36

.32

12

.11

100

.89

Controllable

75

.67

Uncontrollable

37

.33

14.29

<. 0005

69.14

<.0005

12.89

<. 0005

Stability
Stable
Unstable

Controllability

Note: For each analysis, df• 1, N• 112.
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Table 22
Frequency Distributions for the Dimensions of Locus,
stability, and Controllability for Secondary Attributions

Relative
Dimension

Frequency

Chi-Square

Frequency

value

6.72

LOCUS

Internal

47

.65

External

25

.35

Stable

10

.14

unstable

62

.86

Controllable

46

.64

Uncontrollable

26

.36

.01

Stability
37.56

<.0005

Controllability

Note: For each analysis, df• 1, N• 72.

5.56

.02
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Table 23
Frequency Distributions for the Dimensions of Locus,
Stability, and Controllability for Tertiary Attributions

Relative
Dimension

Frequency

Chi-Square

Frequency

Value

5.12

.02

5.12

.02

0.27

.60

LOCUS

Internal

23

.70

External

10

.30

Stable

10

.30

unstable

23

.70

Controllable

18

.55

Uncontrollable

15

.45

Stability

Controllability

Note: For each analysis, df= 1, N• 33.
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In addition to the above analyses, there was an
interest in seeing if the actual attributions (i.e., the
labels) that were made for real symptoms were similar to
that made for the hypothetical symptoms presented in Study
1.

Given the nature of subjects' experience, the only

symptoms that could be used for this purpose were a
headache, upset stomach and sore throat. 17
Of the 51 people who reported a headache as their
primary symptom, 10 said that they had additional
symptoms.

Therefore, the remaining 41 were chosen for

this analysis.

The results showed that 90% of the primary

attributions for a real headache fell into one of the
categories of Table 2.

The two most frequently reported

attributions were stress (N• 15) and fatigue (N• 7).
Ninety-six percent and 100% of the secondary and tertiary
attributions, respectively, also fell into the categories
of Table 2.

Stress and fatigue were again the two most

frequently reported causes for the secondary attribution
(Ns= 8 and 4, respectively).

Only 10 people made a

tertiary attribution, and no one attribution category
appeared to be mentioned over another.
Seven students experienced an upset stomach.

In

each case, he or she made a primary and secondary
attribution that could be classified with the categories
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in Table 5.

Only one of the five tertiary attributions

could not be classified with these categories.

It was

interesting to see that each of the classified attributions fell within the first eight categories listed in
Table 5.

These were the categories that were mentioned

with higher frequency by the subjects of Study 1.
Only four students experienced a sore throat.

In

each case, his or her primary, secondary and tertiary
attribution could be classified within the first seven
categories of Table 6.
Overall, the above results are consistent with the
findings of Study 1.

This suggests that young adults

display the tendency to think of innocuous or manageable
types of causes for symptoms, both imagined and real.

Attributional Effort (Question

l.l

A summary of the multiple regression analysis is
displayed in Table 24.

The eight dummy variables

representing symptom type accounted for an adjusted 4% of
the variance in attributional effort, but the analysis of
variance for regression did not reach statistical
significance.

Symptom characteristics accounted for an

additional 14% of the variance, but symptom duration was
the only variable with a significant regression weight

125
Table 24
summary for the Regression of Attributional Effort on
Symptom, Behavioral, and Individual Difference Variables

Adjusted

Change in

R2

Adjusted R2

variables in the Equation

Step 1
Symptom Type
(8 Variables)
Step 2
Symptom Characteristics
(5 variables)
Step 3
Attributional Response
(1 variable)
Step 4
Individual Difference Measures

.21£

.oo9

(5 variables)

-------------------------------------------------------a !'_(8,98)-

1. 49' .E· .1 7.

c!'_(5,93)• 4.45,
_E• . 0011.
e !'_(1,92)= 4.95,
_E= .03.

9!'_(5,87)< 1.00, .E- .4333 .

b

!'_(13,93)• 2.80, _E• .0021.

d!'_(14,92)= 3.06,
.E- .0007.
f

!'_(19,87)= 2.51, _E= .002.
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(partial~=

.42, !(93)= 4.46, E< .00005).

Attributional

response explained an additional 3% of the variance and
was also statistically significant
2.22,

E•

.0286).

(partial~=

.23, !(92)=

The individual difference variables

explained none of the remaining variance.
A residuals analysis was conducted in order to
examine the appropriateness of the linearity assumption.
It was found that the scatterplot of the predicted and
residual scores showed no discernible pattern.

In

addition, a normal probability plot indicated that the
residuals possessed an underlying normal distribution.
Given these findings,

it was felt that the assumption of

linearity was not violated.
It appears that the number of attributions that were
made by subjects can be accounted for by the duration of
the symptom and how quickly one began to think about those
attributions.

Specifically, individuals who had longer

lasting symptoms and those who made their initial
attribution at the time the symptom appeared tended to
make more attributions.

Attributional Cues (Question

!l

When subjects were asked to describe the information
that led them to make an attribution for their symptom,
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seven themes or categories emerged (see Table 25).

A

description of these, with an exemplary quote, is given
briefly below.
Neglected action.

The idea of a cause came to mind

when the subject remembered that he or she neglected to do
something that would prevent the development of a symptom
(e.g., "I knew I wasn't dressed properly for the weather").
Past experience - pairing of symptom with cause.
The subject thought of a cause from past experience -- or
he/she had been pairing the symptom and cause in recent
past experience (e.g., "I had these symptoms last year and
the doctor diagnosed it as walking pneumonia.

When

these symptoms again, I just knew what it was.

I

had

I didn't

have to think about it. I just intuitively knew what the
cause was.

The thought of a virus was spontaneous.").

Event / activity.

The subject inferred a cause for

his or her symptom from an event that had taken place or
was taking place at the time of the symptom (e.g., "I was
waiting for my flight and it was canceled.

After that,

everybody was scrambling to book another flight.

I just

got a bad headache then.").
Contagion.

The subject thought he or she was

infected by someone who had a contagious condition or was

128

Table 25
sources of Information that Subjects Used to Make
Symptom Attributions

Attribution
Primarya

Source

Secondaryb

Tertiaryc

Neglected Action

.06

.14

.09

Past Experience

.17

.00

.oo

Event or Activity

.65

.45

.35

Contagion

.08

.06

.04

Aspects of the Symptom

.23

.16

.26

Developed More Symptoms .00

.20

.26

Suggestions from Others .02

.06

.04

Other

.06

.13

Note:

.01

The figures in this table reflect proportions of

subjects.

The response of some subjects contained more

than one theme.
aN• 88.

bN= 49.

Thus, columns add to more than 1.00.
cN= 23.

129
affected by a noxious substance that had affected other
people as well (e.g., "My boyfriend and I had eaten dinner
together.
so

I

He's a pretty healthy guy and he got sick too
thought it must have been the sea food we ate").

Aspects of the symptom.

The subject thought of a

cause based upon some attribute of the symptom (e.g., "The
nausea was intense and there was a grinding feeling in my
stomach").
Developed more symptoms.

The subject thought that a

particular cause was operating when he or she developed
additional symptoms (e.g., "[After a while] I developed
diarrhea and got dizzy and felt weak").
Suggestions from others.

The subject thought about

a particular cause after someone else had proposed it
(e.g., "My mom said that it might have been a bladder
infection").
From Table 25 it can be seen that most of the
respondents said that event cues and, to a lesser extent,
symptom cues were the most useful in making symptom
attributions.

Although information from past experience

was thought to play a major role, the data show that such
experience was not helpful beyond the primary attribution.
When two independent raters used the categories of
Table 25 to classify subjects' responses for the primary
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attribution, it was found that there was agreement on 84%
of the cases.

This was found to be significantly greater

than the agreement expected by chance (i.e., 30%), kappa=

.77, Z= 10.04, £< .00005).

Outcomes of Self-Treatment (Question
Belief in one's attribution.

~

Table 26 shows the

distributions of individuals who did and did not try to
relieve their symptom.

It is interesting to see that the

percentage of those who attempted self-treatment steadily
decreased from the primary to the tertiary attribution.
This suggests that if subjects acquired attribution
relevant information from the outcomes of self-treatment,
it was most likely to occur during the earlier stages of
the symptom.
The attempt at self-treatment was analyzed for the
31 people who made all three attributions.

In result, it

was found that the patterns of frequencies and statistical
significance were very similar to that of Table 26.

This

indicates that the above findings are not due to the
attrition of subjects across attributions.
When subjects were asked to discuss how the outcome
of self-treatment influenced the belief in their attribution, several types of responses were found.

Of the 13
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Table 26
Distributions of Respondents Who Did and Did Not Attempt
to Relieve Their Symptom

Relative
Attribution

Frequency

Frequency

Chi-Square
Value

-------------------------------------------------------Primarya
Attempted

79

.71

Did Not Attempt

33

.29

Attempted

40

.57

Did Not Attempt

30

.43

9

.29

22

.71

18.89

<.0005

1. 43

.232

S.45

.020

Secondaryb

Tertiaryc
Attempted
Did Not Attempt

Note: For each analysis, df• 1.
aN• 112.

bN• 70.

CN=31.
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individuals who noted that the outcomes cast doubt upon
their attribution, all said that their symptom persisted.
For example, there was one student who believed that a
twitching in his hands was caused by lack of sleep.

He

treated his condition by going to bed so that he could get
proper rest.

When he awoke, the twitching was still there

and he began to think that lack of sleep was probably not
the cause of his symptom.

When asked why he doubted his

initial attribution he said, "I slept for a good amount of
time and although the shaking stopped a little, it was
still there.

I didn't feel tired, but the shaking was

still there."
Table 27 shows that belief in an attribution was
strengthened after self-treatment primarily when a symptom
was relieved.

For example, one student felt that his sore

throat was caused by a lot of yelling that he was doing at
a soccer game.
vocal activity.

He treated himself by restricting his
When the pain subsided he was convinced

that yelling was the cause. During the interview he said,
"Since I was not using my voice and the pairi was getting
better, I thought that yelling must have been the cause."
There were three subjects who found support for
their attribution when their symptom got worse or did not
go away.

One of these individuals had a headache that she
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Table 27
Perceived Explanations for Support of One'! Attr bution
Following Self-Treatment Outcomes

Attribution
Explanation

Primarya

Secondaryb

Tertiaryc

Symptom was Relieved

.72

.73

l. 00

Symptom Became Worse

.09

.00

.00

.19

.00

.00

.00

.27

.oo

Or Did Not Go Away

Attribution was
Self-Evident

Other

Note: The figures in this table are proportions of
subjects.
a N= 32. b N• 26.

c N= 6.
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thought was caused by tension.

She treated herself by

eating something and found that the headache did not
dissipate.

In her own words she said, "Usually I can eat

and make the headache go away.

When I eat and the

headache doesn't go away, I think that it must be stress."
A few students reported that belief in their
attribution was strengthened following self-treatment
outcomes, but this was not actually the case.

It appears

that they simply felt that that their attribution was
self-evident.

For example, there was one student who

thought that his muscle aches and chills were caused by
the flu.

He treated himself by resting, drinking fluids

and taking aspirin.

When asked why he thought that the

outcome of his action strengthened the belief in his
attribution he said, "Common knowledge -- starve a cold,
feed a fever, drink plenty of fluids.

Doctors will tell

you to do this."
When two independent raters used the categories in
Table 27 to classify subjects' responses for the primary
attribution it was found that there was agreement on 97%
of the cases.

This was found to be significantly greater

than the agreement expected by chance (i.e., 57%), kappa=
.93,

!= 6.80, E< .00005).
Making

~

reattribution.

Table 28 shows that
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Table 28
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for

One'~

Primary

Attribution (Following Self-Treatment Outcomes) and the
Making of !

Secondary Attribution

Belief in Primary Attribution

Weakened

Supported Unaffected

+---------+---------+---------+
Yes
Made

( • 90)

15
( • 4 7)

24

( •73 )

+---------+---------+---------+

Secondary
Attribution

9

No

1

( . 10 )

17
( •53 )

9
( • 2 7)

+---------+---------+---------+
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,

X2 (2, N• 75)• 8.10, £• .0174.
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subjects tended to make a secondary attribution if their
belief in the primary attribution was weakened or
unaffected by self-treatment outcomes.

If their belief

was strengthened, however, subjects showed no tendency to
make or not make a secondary attribution, ~ 2 (2, ~= 75)=
8.10, £= .0174.

This finding suggests that confirmation

of one's attribution from self-treatment outcomes does not
influence subsequent attributional activity.

However,

there is an inclination to make a reattribution if one's
initial attribution is disconfirmed or unaffected.
Table 29 examines the tendency of making a tertiary
attribution in terms of the strength of one's belief in
the secondary attribution following self-treatment
outcomes.

The above finding was not replicated,

x2

(2, N=

40)= 3.70, £• .1574.

Sickness Beliefs (Question §_l_
The perception of being sick.

When respondents were

asked if they considered themselves to be sick, it was
expected that most would have felt that they were not.
Table 30 shows that this expectation had greatest support
at the time of the primary attribution.

However, the

tendency to believe that one was not sick diminished
over time.

In fact, the subjects who made a tertiary
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Table 29
crosstabulation of the Belief strength for One'! Secondary
Attribution (Following Self-Treatment Outcomes) and the
Making of

~

Tertiary Attribution

Belief in Secondary Attribution

Weakened

Supported unaffected

+---------+---------+---------+
Yes

2

( • 50 )

Made

9

( • 35 )

7
( • 7 0)

+---------+---------+---------+

Tertiary
Attribution

No

2

( •50 )

17
( • 6 5)

3

( • 30 )

+---------+---------+---------+
------------------------~-------------------------------

Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,

x 2 (2,

N=

40)= 3.70, £= .1574.
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Table 30
Distributions of Respondents Who Did and Did Not Believe

Relative
Attribution

Frequency

Frequency

Chi-Square
Value

-------------------------------------------------------.
a
Primary
Sick

26

.23

Not Sick

86

.77

Sick

28

.40

Not Sick

42

.60

Sick

16

.52

Not Sick

15

.48

23.14

<.0005

Secondaryb
2.80

.09

0.03

.86

Tertiaryc
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attribution showed no inclination to believe one way or
another.

This finding implies that there might be an

automatic tendency to doubt that one is sick when faced
with common symptoms, but that this is likely to change
with the passage of time.

It might be more difficult to

rule out being sick when one's symptom persists.
The perception of being sick was analyzed for the 31
people who made all three attributions.

In result, it was

found that the patterns of frequencies and statistical
significance were similar to that of Table 30.

This

suggests that the above findings are not due to the
attrition of subjects across attributions.
Making a reattribution.

Table 31 shows that the

perception of being sick at the time of the primary
attribution did not inhibit the tendency to make a
secondary attribution, ~ 2 (1, ~- 112)= 2.06, £= .1514.
Similarly, Table 32 shows that the perception of being
sick at the time of the secondary attribution did not
inhibit the tendency to make a tertiary attribution, -x2
( 1 I N= 70)= 0.77, £= .3790.

Lay Conferral (Question

21.

Discussing symptoms with

~

consultants.

Although

it was expected that subjects would exhibit a tendency to
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Table 31
Crosstabulation of One'! Belief About Being Sick at the
Time of the Primary Attribution and the Making of

~

Secondary Attribution

Belief About Being Sick

Sick

Not Sick

+---------+---------+
20

Yes

( • 77)

Made

( • 62 )

+---------+---------+

Secondary
Attribution

53

No

6
( • 2 3)

33
( • 38 )

+---------+---------+
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,

X2 (1, N= 112)= 2.06, £• .1514.
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Table 32
Crosstabulation of One'! Belief About Being Sick at the
Time of the Secondary Attribution and the Making of a
Tertiary Attribution

Belief About Being Sick

Sick

Not Sick

+---------+---------+
Yes
Made

18

( • 54 )

( • 43 )

+---------+---------+

Tertiary
Attribution

15

No

13
( • 46)

24
( • 57 )

+---------+---------+
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,
2
X (1, N• 70)• 0.77, £• .3790.
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discuss their symptom with others, Table 33 shows that
this was true only at the time of the primary attribution.
The same pattern of frequencies and statistical significance was found for the 31 people who made all three
attributions, thus indicating that findings are not due to
the attrition of subjects across attributions.
Table 34 shows that the number of consulted individuals steadily decreased over time.

It was interesting

to find that the average number of lay consultants at the
time of the primary attribution was very close to that
reported by Sanders (1982) for a similar group of college
students (i.e., 2.7).
Consistent with social comparison theory, students
tended to talk about their symptom most often with friends
(see Table 35).

It was interesting, however, to see that

they did not turn very often to siblings or roommates.
Instead, they showed more of an inclination to have discussions with parents.

Although this would not neces-

sarily be predicted by social comparison theory, it might
have occurred because younger people are accustomed to
seeking parental advice during times of doubt.
The intention to discuss symptoms.

Table 36 shows

the distributions of subjects who did and did not intend
to discuss their symptoms with others.

There was no
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Table 33
Distributions of Respondents Who Did and Did Not Discuss
Their Symptom With

~

Lay Consultant

Relative
Attribution

Frequency

Chi-Square

Frequency

Value

14.29

Primarya
Discussed

76

.68

Did Not Discuss

36

.32

Discussed

37

.53

Did Not Discuss

33

.47

Discussed

13

.42

Did Not Discuss

18

.58

<.0005

Secondaryb
0.23

.63

0.81

.37

Tertiaryc

Note: For each analysis, df• 1.
aN• 112.

bN• 70.

CN• 31.
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Table 34
The Number of Individuals With Whom Subjects Discussed
Their Symptom

Range
Maximum

Median

Minimum

Primarya

2.56

1

20

Secondaryb

2.00

1

15

Tertiaryc

1.60

1

3

Attribution

Note: High maximum values were reported by three subjects
who discussed their symptom during social gatherings.
b

N=

36.

c N• 13.
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Table 35
Types of Individuals Whom Subjects Sought to Discuss
Their Symptom

Attribution
Individual Sought

.
a
Primary

Secondaryb

Tertiaryc

Coworkers

.13

.03

.00

Friends

.78

.65

.77

Parents

.41

.46

.31

Siblings

.14

.16

.15

Other Relatives

.09

.05

.00

Roommates

.24

.14

.08

Clergy

.01

.oo

.00

Spouse

.05

.03

.08

Other

.07

.03

.00

Note: The figures in the table are proportions of
subjects.

Columns add to more than 1.00 because some

subjects spoke with more than one type of individual.

a N= 76.

b

N= 37.

c N=l3.
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Table 36
Distributions of Respondents Who Did and Did Not Intend
to Discuss Their Symptom With

~

Lay Consultant

Relative
Attribution

Frequency

Frequency

Chi-Square
Value

-------------------------------------------------------Primarya
Intended

37

.49

Did Not Intend

39

.51

Intended

25

.68

Did Not Intend

12

.32

11

.85

2

.15

0.05

.82

4.57

.03

6.23

.01

Secondaryb

Tertiaryc
Intended
Did Not Intend

Note: For each analysis, df• 1.
aN• 76.

bN= 37.

cN=l3.
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observable inclination at the time of the primary attribution.

Over time, however, there was a steady increase

in the proportion of individuals who wanted to discuss
their symptom.
The intention to discuss symptoms was analyzed for
the 13 people who made all three attributions.

In result,

it was found that the patterns of frequencies and statistical significance were very similar to that of Table
36, thus indicating that the above findings are not due to
the attrition of subjects across attributions.
It is interesting to consider this finding in light
of what was found with the data in Table 33.

Although the

general tendency to talk with a lay consultant decreased
over time, the individuals who did discuss their symptom
apparently had an increasing desire to do so.
The correlations of perceived discomfort with the
intent to discuss one's symptom at the time of the
primary, secondary, and tertiary attributions were -.11,
.26, and .55, respectively.

The same correlations for

perceived seriousness were, in order, -.OS, .12, and .37.
A similar pattern of coefficients was found with those
individuals who made all three attributions.

For

discomfort, the correlations were .15, .14, and .SS,
respectively.

And for perceived seriousness the corre-
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lations were .03, .03, and .37, respectively.

None of the

coefficients reached the .OS level of significance, but it
is worth noting that the relationship between subjective
distress and the intent to discuss one's symptom tended to
increase over time.
comparison theory.

This makes sense in terms of social
If individuals had symptoms that were

discomforting (either physically or psychologically) and
they were unable to establish a cause at an early point,
then the need for comparison information would probably
increase over time.
Lay consultants who made an attribution.

Table 37

reveals that lay consultants tended to make an attribution
for subjects' symptoms only at the time of the primary
attribution.

It should be noted, however, that although

statistical significance diminished across analyses, the
relative distributions of responses remained somewhat
constant.

Just about two thirds of the subjects reported

that a lay consultant made an attribution for his or her
symptom at the point of the primary, secondary, and
tertiary attribution.
Table 38 indicates that lay consultants tended to
make symptom attributions that were similar to those made
by subjects.

In addition, subjects reported that this

made them believe more strongly in their attribution (see
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Table 37
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That
consultant Did and Did Not Make

~

Lay

Symptom Attribution

Relative
Frequency

Frequency

Did

49

.65

Did Not

27

.35

Did

22

.60

Did Not

15

.40

Did

9

.69

Did Not

4

.31

Attribution

~

Chi-Square
Value

E

Primarya
6.37

.01

1. 32

.25

1. 92

.17

Secondaryb

Tertiaryc

Note: For each analysis, df• 1.
aN• 76.

bN• 37.

cN• 13.
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Table 38
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That

~

Lay

consultant Made a Similar or Different Symptom
Attribution

Relative
Attribution

Frequency

Frequency

Chi-Square
Value

-------------------------------------------------------Primarya
Similar

39

.80

Different

10

.20

17

.77

5

.23

Similar

6

.67

Different

3

.33

17.16

<.0005

Secondaryb
Similar
Different

6.55

.01

1. 00

.32

Tertiaryc

Note: For each analysis, df= 1.

a N• 49. b N= 22.

c N= 9.
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Table 39).

Both of these trends were evident at the time

of the primary and secondary attributions.
The data for Tables 37, 38, and 39 were re-analyzed
for the individuals who made all three attributions (Ns=
13, 9, and 6, respectively).

In result, it was found that

the patterns of frequencies and statistical significance
were similar for the subjects from Tables 37 and 38.
However, the small number of subjects from Table 39 made
it difficult to observe a response pattern.

Overall, this

suggests that the above findings are not due to the
attrition of subjects across attributions.
Making a reattribution.

Table 40 shows that the

belief strength in one's primary attribution following a
lay consultant's causal ascription was unrelated to the
tendency to make a secondary attribution, ~ 2 (2, N• 49)=
3.28, £• .194.

Likewise, Table 41 indicates that the

belief strength in one's secondary attribution under the
same conditions was unrelated to making a tertiary
attribution,

~ 2 (2, ~- 22)= 3.18, £= .204.

Lay consultants who did not make an attribution.
a number of instances, lay consultants did not propose a
cause for the subject's symptom but said something that
reportedly strengthened the belief in the subject's
attribution.

Table 42 depicts the types of information

In
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Table 39
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That They Did and
Did Not Feel More Strongly About Their Attribution When
It was Shared

.ey

Lay Consultant

~

Relative

Chi-Square

Frequency

Frequency

Value

31

.80

13.56

<.0005

8

.20

16

.94

13.24

<.0005

1

.06

Did

4

.67

Did Not

2

.33

Attribution

Primarya
Did
Did Not
Secondaryb
Did
Did Not
Tertiaryc

Note: For each analysis, df• 1.
a

N• 39.

b

N• 17.

c

N• 6.

0.67

.41
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Table 40
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for One'! Primary
Attribution and the Making of !

Secondary Attribution

Following an Attribution That Was Made

! Lay Consultant

~

Belief in Primary Attribution

Strengthened

weak-

Unaffected

ened

+---------+---------+---------+
21

Yes

( • 68)

Made

( • 86)

5
( • 4 5)

+---------+---------+---------+

Secondary
Attribution

6

No

10
( • 32 )

1

( .14 )

6
( • 5 5)

+---------+---------+---------+
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,

x2

(2, N• 49)• 3.28,

E·

.194.
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Table 41
One'~

Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for
Attribution and the Making of !

Secondary

Tertiary Attribution

Following an Attribution That Was Made

~

!

~

Consultant

Belief in Secondary Attribution

strengthened

Weak-

Unaffected

ened

+---------+---------+---------+
Yes

( . so)

Made

3

( 1. 00)

1
( • 3 3)

+---------+---------+---------+

Tertiary
Attribution

8

8

No

( • so)

0
( • 0 0)

2

( . 6 7)

+---------+---------+---------+
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,

X2 (2, N• 22)• 3.18, p• .204.
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Table 42
Types of lnformation that Supported Subjects' Symptom
Attribution When the Lay Consultant Did Not Make an
Attribution

Relative
Type of Information

The Lay Consultant Had

Frequencya

Frequency

6

.33

4

.11

8

.44

a Similar Problem

The Lay Consultant Agreed
With The Attribution

The Lay Consultant
Gave Implied Support

Note: The data were collapsed across the primary and
secondary attribution because the Ns were small. There
were no data on this item for the tertiary attribution.
aN• 18.
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that fall into this category.
In some cases a lay consultant noted that he or she
had a problem that was similar to that of the subject.
For example, there was one individual who felt that a
piercing pain in her lower right abdomen was caused by
hunger.

When she described her encounter with a friend

she noted the following:

"She said that she had been

feeling hunger pains lately.

I said 'Yeh, I've been

feeling these a lot lately too'."
In other instances, the lay consultant simply agreed
with the subject's appraisal of his or her condition.

For

example, one student had an itchy rash that he thought was
caused by a chemical fertilizer that he encountered while
playing soccer.

When he described a discussion with a

friend he said, "I told him what I thought was the cause
of the rash, and he agreed with me."
In still other instances, the lay consultant gave
some type of implied support for the subject's attribution.

In other words, something was said that provided

indirect or unintentional support.

For example, one

respondent had a headache that she believed was caused by
tension.

During the interview she described what a work

associate told her: "She said that this place can drive
you nuts.

She's a ward secretary like me and does similar
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kinds of work."
There was a total of five people who felt that the
lay consultant made a comment that cast doubt upon their
attribution.

Obviously, there were not enough cases to

form meaningful groupings.

However, it appeared as though

the lay consultant basically discounted the subject's
attribution.

For example, there was one student who had a

headache that he believed was caused by too much smoking.
He discussed his friend's reaction to this by saying, "My
friend thought I was crazy.

He's a lifetime smoker and he

never got a headache from cigarettes."
When two independent raters used the categories In
Table 42 to classify subjects' responses for the primary
attribution it was found that there was agreement on 93%
of the cases.

This was found to be significantly greater

than the agreement expected by chance (i.e., 37%), kappa•
.89, !• 4.69, £< .00005).
Making

~

reattribution.

Table 43 shows that the

belief strength in one's primary attribution following a
lay consultant's comments was unrelated to the tendency to
make a secondary attribution, ~ 2 (2, N= 27)= 0.79, £~
.673.

Similarly, Table 44 indicates that the belief

strength in one's secondary attribution under the same
conditions was unrelated to making a tertiary attribution,
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Table 43
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for

One'~

Primary

Attribution and the Making of a Secondary Attribution
Following

~

Discussion in Which

~

Lay Consultant Did Not

Make an Attribution

Belief in Primary Attribution

Strength-

weak-

ened

ened

Unaffected

+---------+---------+---------+
Yes
Made

( •73 )

2
(1.00)

7
( • 7 0)

+---------+---------+---------+

Secondary
Attribution

11

No

4
( • 2 7)

0
( • 00)

3
( • 3 0)

+---------+---------+---------+
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,
x 2 (2, N• 27)• o.79, E- .673.
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Table 44
Crosstabulation of the Belief Strength for

One'~

Secondary

Attribution and the Making of a Tertiary Attribution
Following ! Discussion in Which ! Lay Consultant Did Not
Make an Attribution

Belief in Secondary Attribution

Strength-

Weak-

ened

ened

Unaffected

+---------+---------+---------+
Yes
Made

( • 6 7)

0
( • 00)

3
( • 30)

+---------+---------+---------+

Tertiary
Attribution

2.

No

1

( • 3 3)

2
( 1. 00)

7

( • 70)

+---------+---------+---------+
-------------------------------------------------------Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,
x2 (2, N• 15)• 2.25, £• .279.
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X2 (2, N= 15)= 2.55, £= .279.

use of Medical Guides and Health Professionals (Question

The data in Tables 45 and 46 are fairly clear. It is
evident that few subjects consulted medical guides or
health professionals to help them diagnose their symptoms.
However, it was found that subjects were more likely to
visit a health professional than read a medical guide at
the time of the tertiary attribution, Cochran

31)• 5.00, £• .0253.

Q (1, N•

These analyses indicate that indi-

viduals who experience common symptoms are not likely to
seek, and thus not use, attribution information that is
acquired from formal or professional sources (even though
they are relatively more likely to see a doctor or nurse
during the latter course of their symptom).
The use of medical guides and health professionals
were re-analyzed for those individuals who made all three
attributions (N= 31 for each analysis).

In both cases it

was found that the patterns of frequencies and statistical
significance were very similar to that in Tables 45 and
46.

Hence, the above findings are probably not due to to

the attrition of subjects across attributions.
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Table 45
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That They Did and
Did Not Refer to a Medical Guide

Relative
Attribution

Chi-Square

Frequency

Value

6

.OS

89.29

<.0005

106

.95

3

.04

57.52

<.0005

66

.96

0

.oo

31.00

<.0005

31

1. 00

Frequency

Primarya
Did
Did Not
Secondaryb
Did
Did Not
Tertiaryc
Did
Did Not

-------------------------------------------------------Note: For each analysis, df• 1.
aN• 112.

bN• 69.

CN• 31.
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Table 46
Distributions of Respondents Who Said That They Did and
Se~k

Did Not

Professional Medical Help

Relative
Attribution

Frequency

Frequency

Chi-Square
Value

-------------------------------------------------------Primary

a

Did
Did Not

12

.11

100

.89

5

.07

65

.93

5

.16

26

.84

69.14

<.0005

51. 43

<.0005

14.23

<.0005

Secondaryb
Did
Did Not
Tertiaryc
Did
Did Not

Note: For each analysis, df• 1.
aN• 112.

bN• 70.

CN• 31.
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Doubt-Provoking Information (Question

2.1

Types of doubt-provoking information.

When subjects

were asked if there was anything that made them think that
their attribution might be wrong, nine themes or categories emerged.

These are listed in Table 47.

Surpris-

ingly, about half the categories were found to be similar
to those in Table 25.

This would indicate that indi-

viduals draw upon a similar range of information to aid
them in deciding the likelihood and unlikelihood of
symptom attributions.

Each of the categories are de-

scribed below.
Neglected action.

The subjects doubted an attri-

bution when there was a recollection that he or she
neglected to do something that would keep him or her from
developing a symptom.

For example, one student initially

thought that her headache was caused by stress but then
changed her mind.

She said, "I didn't eat much that day.

I just had juice in the morning.

I thought that that

might be causing the headache."
Unexpected symptom behavior.

The subject was

inclined to discount an attribution because the behavior
of his or her symptom was not consistent with that attribution (e.g., the symptom persisted too long, went away
too soon, or acted in an unusual or unpredictable way).
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Table 47
Sources of Information that Cast Doubt Upon One's
Symptom Attribution

Attribution
Primarya

Source

Secondaryb

.

Ter t iary

.08

.oo

.07

Unexpected symptom Behavior .38

.29

.43

Developed Unexpected

.13

.16

.oo

Attribution/Self-perception .12

.13

.21

Neglected Action

Symptoms

Inconsistency
Event/Activity

.19

.10

.07

Suggestions From Others

.10

.00

.07

Doctor's Diagnosis

.00

.10

.07

Lack of Expected symptoms

.02

.19

.07

Contagion

.08

.03

.00

Other

.02

.06

.00

Note: The figures in this table represent proportions of
subjects.

Response of some subjects contained more than

one theme.

aN• 52.

Thus, some columns add to more than 1.00.

bN~ 31.

CN• 14.

c
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One student initially thought that her stomach ache was
cased by drinking too much Cola.

She doubted this later.

Her comment about this was, "I wouldn't expect sharp pains
from the Coke.

I had sharp pains."

Developed unexpected symptoms.

There was doubt

regarding an attribution when the individual experienced
additional symptoms that were not consistent with his or
her attribution.

One person thought that a swollen left

ear was caused by trauma which he sustained while wrestling with a friend.

He then felt that this was not the

case when he developed an unexpected symptom.

He said,

"My ear was turning black on the inside and I thought that
getting hit on the outside of the ear wouldn't affect the
inside of the ear."
Attribution /

self-perception inconsistency.

This

category is actually called "Inconsistency between One's
Attribution and the Observation of One Self, One's
activity, or One's past experience."

Basically, the

respondent discounted an attribution because it was
inconsistent with knowledge of his or her actions, behaviors or past experience.

For example, there was one

student who had a headache that he initially thought was
caused by lack of sleep.

He mentioned that he discredited

this idea by saying, "I knew how much sleep I had during
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the week.

I knew I was getting eight hours of sleep a

day."
Event I

activity.

The respondent thought that his

or her attribution might be incorrect based upon the
observation of some event or activity.

One student had a

headache that he thought was due to eye strain.

When

asked why he began to doubt this he said, "Just the fact
that I knew that I had been stressed out for a while.

I

had a lot of school work to do and I had a few personal
problems."
Suggestions from others.

Doubt regarding an

attribution occurred when someone suggested an alternative
explanation for one's symptom.

For example, one respon-

dent had a sore throat and fever that he believed was
caused by the cold weather.

When he was asked why he

started to discount this he said, "My friend mentioning
that I could have mono."
Doctor's diagnosis.

Individuals abandoned their

symptom attribution when a physician made a contrary
diagnosis.
Lack of expected symptoms.

The doubt about an

attribution began to occur when someone did not get
expected symptoms.

One student, for example, had a fever

that he thought was due to the flu.

When asked why he
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gave up on this idea he said, "I didn't have nausea."
Contagion.

Doubt regarding an attribution occurred

when an individual thought he or she was infected by
someone who had a contagious condition or was affected by
a noxious substance that had affected other people as
well.

There was one person who thought that his sore

throat was due to his being "run down."

He was asked why

he felt that this attribution might not be correct.

He

said, "My roommate had been sick earlier and I thought I
might have picked up something from him."
Looking at that the overall proportions in Table 47
it can be seen that most of the respondents said that
doubt about an attribution was provoked by symptom cues,
especially the unexpected behavior of symptoms.

A fewer,

but noteworthy, number also mentioned event cues and the
perception of inconsistency as described above.
Persuasion and expectancy/outcome incongruity were
discussed earlier in terms of their presumed ability to
promote reattributions.

The data suggest that both are

possible, but the latter is much more likely to occur.

In

fact, expectancy/outcome incongruity appears to be a most
influential factor.
Making a reattribution.

The last two tables

describe the relationship between doubt-provoking infor-
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mation and subsequent attribution activity.

Table 48

shows that when subjects believed there was something to
suggest doubt in their primary attribution, they tended to
make a secondary attribution.

When doubt was absent, they

tended to retain their primary attribution,
112)• 24.59, E< .00005.

Table 49 replicates this finding

for the secondary and tertiary attributions,
70)• 4.47, E• .0345.

! 2 (1, ~-

x2

(1, N=
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Table 48
Crosstabulation of the Presence of Doubt-Provoking
Information for the Primary Attribution and the
Making of ! Secondary Attribution

Doubt-Provoking Information

Present

Absent

+---------+---------+
Yes

49
( . 88)

Made

24
( • 43 )

+---------+---------+

Secondary

7

No

Attribution

( .12)

32
( • 5 7)

+---------+---------+
Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,
2
X (1, N• 112)• 24.59,

£<

.00005.
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Table 49
Crosstabulation of the Presence of Doubt-Provoking
Information for the Secondary Attribution and the
Making of

~

Tertiary Attribution

Doubt-Provoking Information

Present

Absent

+---------+---------+
19

Yes

(.61)

Made

( • 36 )

+---------+---------+

Tertiary
Attribution

14

No

12
( • 39)

25
( • 64 )

+---------+---------+
-------------------------------------------------------Note: Parenthetical expressions are column proportions,

X2 (1, N• 70)• 4.47, £• .0345.

DISCUSSION FOR STUDY 2

There are four conclusions about the naive
diagnostician that can be drawn from the results of study
2.

Each of these is discussed below.

A NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTIONS ARE TYPICALLY MADE DURING THE
COURSE OF A SYMPTOM.
The results of Study 2 have shown that 63% of the
subjects thought about two or more causes for their symptom.

It appears that multiple attributions are typical of

self-diagnosis.

The naive diagnostician probably needs to

consider a number of potential causes because he or she
does not collect systematic data.

As such, attributions

are made and then evaluated for accuracy with information
that is easily available.

This is in contrast to the

diagnostic activity of young medical students who are
content with the first plausible diagnosis that comes to
mind and are inclined to favor evidence that supports it
(Mentzer & Snyder, 1982).
It was surprising to find that the number of attributions made by subjects was related only to symptom
duration and attributional response.
171

Although symptom
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enumeration was discussed in Study 1 as a possible
individual difference variable, the results of Study 2
show that it bore no relationship to attributional effort.
In other words, the extent to which perceived causes came
to mind was unrelated to how much work one actually put
into his or her self-diagnosis.

If diagnostic effort is

independent of symptom features (e.g., discomfort, seriousness, prior experience), and health-related personality
traits (e.g., private body consciousness), it would appear
that the naive diagnostician relies heavily upon cognitive
activity.

The results of Study 2 suggest that incon-

sistency between one's attribution and symptom activity is
a major driving force of attributional effort.

This will

be discussed in more detail later.

ATTRIBUTIONS ARE TRIGGERED PRIMARILY BY EVENT AND SYMPTOM
CUES.
The analysis of open-ended responses found that
different types of information were useful for making
symptom attributions.

However, the most useful were

events and activities that occurred at or around the time
of the symptom.

Following this were aspects of the symp-

tom and the development of additional symptoms.

Although

prior experience was thought to be a rich source of
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information, it was not found to be useful beyond the
primary attribution.
The generalization of this finding to older individuals is questionable. The subjects of Study 2 were
young, healthy college students who have not experienced a
great deal of illness.

In addition, they are involved in

an active social and academic life that includes experiences such as dating, socialization, stressful examinations and so on.

Hence, it is not difficult to see why

these individuals rely more upon event cues than past
experience cues.

If older or infirm groups of people were

surveyed, it might be found that the relative usefulness
of these cues would be different

past experience cues

might be given equal or more weight than event cues.
The fact that subjects relied upon symptom
information to help them make an attribution appears to be
consistent with the illness prototype model, but not with
the hypothesis verification model.

The latter presumes

that symptoms confirm an existing hypothesis about the
cause of an ill feeling.

Many of the subjects in Study 2,

however, used the quality and behavior of symptoms to
generate a hypothesis.

At the outset of this study it was

believed that symptom attributes were important to the
naive diagnostician, but it was not realized how imper-
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tant.

Although the qualities of symptoms do not seem to

account for the number of attributions that were made,
they do appear to be a major influence for the

~

of

attributions that were made.

THE NAIVE DIAGNOSTICIAN TENDS TO MAKE INNOCUOUS AND
MANAGEABLE ATTRIBUTIONS FOR SYMPTOMS.
Consistent with Study 1, the subjects in Study 2
made attributions that were predominately internal,
controllable and unstable.

This demonstrates that the

subjects from both studies tended to think of harmless and
manageable causes for symptoms.
At the time of Study 1 it was felt that subjects'
benign causes could be explained in three ways:

(1) by

the nature of the experimental task (being provided with
common, harmless symptoms),

(2) by some form of intrinsic

response tendency such as a motivational bias, and (3) by
the fact that most young and healthy people are not
typically bothered with serious conditions (and thus are
not considered during self-diagnosis).
The results from Study 2 have shown that individuals
made benign and manageable attributions for a variety of
real symptoms that covered a wide range of perceived
discomfort and seriousness.

It is therefore logical to
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assume that thinking of these types of causes is not
simply an experimental artifact.
The results, however, cannot discredit either of the
other two explanations.
Ditto et al.

It was mentioned earlier that

(1988) found that subjects tended to mitigate

the threat of illness when they were erroneously informed
that a they had pancreatic disease.

The authors argue

that there is an automatic tendency to minimize illness
threat.

Likewise, Robinson (1971) has noted that it is

common for people to think of benign interpretations of a
symptom when it is experienced by all members of a family
or when it is an expected part of one's role (e.g.,
tiredness of a blue collar worker).

Hence, a motivational

bias and the low incidence of serious conditions in one's
life can both account for the types of causes that were
found in Studies 1 and 2.

Whatever the explanation, the

tendency to think of innocuous and manageable causes for
symptoms is evident.

However, additional research will

need to be done in order to shed additional light upon
this matter.

SYMPTOM REATTRIBUTIONS ARE STIMULATED PRIMARILY BY
INCONSISTENCY.
One of the goals of Study 2 was to examine factors
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that nurture and inhibit symptom reattributions.

It was

believed that the outcome of self-treatment, the perception of being sick, discussions with lay consultants,
visits with health professionals, and information in
medical guides would be sources of such influence.
It was found that some of these factors are
consistent throughout the course of one's symptom, while
others are not.

Subjects rarely visited a health pro-

fessional or read a medical guide to help them interpret
their symptom.

The former is not surprising given that

college age people are known to be low users of health
care providers (NCHS, 1981; sanders, 1982) and, indeed,
are usually quite healthy.

Collectively, however, these

findings indicate that doctors, nurses, and medical guides
are consistently not utilized as sources of attributional
information.

These sources could certainly be helpful,

but they are not commonly sought by young, healthy
individuals.
The frequency of those who treated their symptom and
those who discussed it with a lay consultant was high at
the beginning.

However, this changed.

By the time of the

tertiary attribution, subjects reported that they were not
treating their symptom and that they had no preference for
talking with a lay consultant.

This suggests that attri-
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butional information from these sources would come early
during the course of one's symptom.
The perception of being sick also showed change over
time.

At first, subjects tended to believe that they were

not sick.

By the time of the tertiary attribution the

tendency disappeared.

If this perception is influential,

one would expect to see reattributions primarily towards
the beginning of symptomatic episodes.
The results demonstrated that reattributions were
not reliably related to any of the above factors.
Although subjects felt that the belief in their attribution was influenced, there was no systematic connection
with behavior.
Only one analysis uncovered a correlate.

Subjects

tended to make a secondary attribution if the belief in
their primary attribution was weakened or unaffected by
the outcome of self-treatment.

If the belief was

strengthened, they showed no tendency to make or not make
a secondary attribution.
This finding is most unusual and should be
interpreted carefully.

If the outcome of self-treatment

is influential, one would expect to see people making
reattributions when their attribution belief is weakened,
and not making reattributions when their belief is
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strengthened.

Perhaps this is what might have been

happening, but the sample size (N= 75) was too small to
detect it.

In fact, a larger sample size would have been

more favorable for the interpretation of the other
reattribution analyses.
The most interpretable findings were related to
subjects' responses about doubt-provoking information.
The last two tables in the results section show that when
subjects had doubt about their attribution they tended to
make a reattribution, otherwise they did not.

An analysis

of open-ended responses found that subjects doubted their
attribution when it was inconsistent with subsequent symptom behavior.

Doubt was also provoked when they developed

unexpected symptoms or did not experience symptoms that
were expected.

The inconsistency between an attribution

and the perception of one's actions or past experience
also provoked doubt.

Although not related to incon-

sistency, events that suggested another plausible cause
for one's symptom appeared to have a similar effect.

A Model of the Naive Diagnostician
The facts that have been learned from this study can
be synthesized into a model of the naive diagnostician.
Although this cannot represent the experience of everyone,
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it summarizes the accounts of many individuals who were
involved in this study.
Figure 2 shows that when a symptom is experienced,
an attribution is made by evaluating event and/or symptom
cues.

Doubt is cast upon the attribution if one or more

of the following occur: (1) the symptom behaves in an
unexpected fashion,

(2) unexpected symptoms occur, (3)

there is inconsistency between an attribution and the
observation of one's past actions or experience, (4)
expected symptoms do not occur, and (5) an event suggests
another plausible cause.

If there is doubt, the indi-

vidual evaluates current event and symptom cues in order
to make a reattribution.

If none of the doubt-provoking

events occurs, one's attribution or reattribution is
retained for the duration of the symptom.

The individual

finally concludes that the symptom was caused by the
factor that was on his or her mind at the end of the
symptom episode.
The model in Figure 2 can provide insight to the
delay in seeking medical care that is characteristic of
heart attack victims (e.g., see Green at al., 1974).

It

was noted earlier that many individuals misdiagnose the
prodromal symptoms of a myocardial infarction as indigestion.

This might be related to the nature of the

Figure 2. A Model of the Naive Diagnostician.
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symptom (a painful chest discomfort) as well as the time
at which it occurs (after eating a meal).

If the symptom

and event cues indicate indigestion to the perceiver, this
is the attribution that will be retained until something
casts doubt upon it.

The victim will begin to change his

or her mind when the presumed indigestion does not dissipate within an expected period of time, or when unexpected
symptoms such as severe chest pains occur.
case, this takes time.

In either

Time that might prove to be fatal.

Applications
The application of research findings must always be
made carefully.

However, it appears that knowledge

acquired from this study could be useful in at least two
ways.
First, health professionals should be apprised of
the characteristics of the naive diagnostician.

They

should learn how lay individuals think about the causes of
their symptoms.

If for no other reason, this will reify

the notion that average individuals possess ways of
thinking that are quite different from what is learned
through professional education, a point that is often
forgotten.

A knowledge of the naive diagnostician could

provide direction for research in problematic areas such
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as non-compliance and the delay in seeking health care.
In addition, it could potentially increase the general
impact of health care practice by creating a tangible
model of how patients think.

This could be used to

maximize the efficacy of therapeutic interventions (cf.
Gillick, 1985).
Second, patients and other lay individuals should be
introduced to the tendencies of their thinking about
symptoms.

This could be accomplished through patient or

community education programs.

By learning about naive

diagnostic reasoning, people can become aware of how
natural inclinations at self-diagnosis can have a major
impact upon their health.

In all, this could promote

considerable insight as well as a sense of mastery about
one's own health care management.

Conclusion
Using a survey approach, Study 2 examined the
attributional activity of young adults who experienced a
real symptom.

The purpose of this was to discover the

ways in which symptom attributions are formed and altered
over time.
The results of Study 2 were synthesized into a model
of the naive diagnostician.

This model posits that a
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symptom attribution is initially triggered by event and
symptom cues.

If one encounters something that casts

doubt upon that attribution, he or she makes a
bution.

~attri

If not, the perceived cause is retained until the

symptom dissipates.
The model of the naive diagnostician offers a new
perspective on the topic of symptom attribution.

It is a

simple model that has its origin in the accounts of young
adults who have experienced real symptoms.

Its major

distinguishing feature is that it views symptom attributions in the context of a dynamic process -- a kind of
trial and error.

This does not guarantee diagnostic

accuracy, but it recognizes the average person as an
active participant in his or her self-diagnosis.
In the future,

research efforts should be focused

upon tests of the model.

For example, it will be

important to see how well the model predicts the selfdiagnosi s of older adults as well as post-attributional
behaviors such as self-treatment strategies and the
decisions to seek health case.

Overall, the model needs

to be pushed to its limits in order to discover its
strengths and weaknesses.

As this is done, more will be

known about the naive diagnostician.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

A colostomy is a surgical procedure that routes
the colon to an artificial exit in the abdomen.
Waste is collected in a small plastic bag. Spillage
occurs when the seal between the bag and the abdomen
becomes loose. Many spillages are due to a watery
discharge.

2.

Students were asked to record their grade point
average as a proxy measure for intelligence.
However, only eight individuals could provide this
information because most were first year freshmen.
As such, the variable was not reported nor used in
any analyses.

3.

The dimensions of locus, stability, and
controllability -- and the dimensions of
internality, stability, and globality appear to be
similar in nature. In addition, both schemes have
been used in attributional research. However, the
former dimensions have been used primarily in
studies where the investigator has classified
perceived causes, whereas the latter dimensions have
been used in studies where subjects have classified
or rated perceived causes. Therefore, the former
dimensions were used in the present study because
the investigator was classifying subjects' perceived causes and because the scheme appeared to
be more applicable to the present research.

4.

An important distinction needs to be made here.
A cause was considered controllable if it was felt
that an individual could exert an influence on the
cause itself, not the resulting symptom. Thus, an
allergy was classified as uncontrollable because
there is nothing that the average individual can do
to influence his or her immune system, even though
one can take a non-prescription drug that will
alleviate the symptoms of an allergy.

5.

This was a finding from a survey of college
students that was conducted by the investigator
at an earlier time.

6.

Subjects' position at the university was
196
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not used in the multiple regression analyses
because of its high correlation with age. In
a one-way analysis of variance it was found that
student position accounted for 84% of the variance
in age, ! (2, 32) • 86.76, £ < .00005 (it should be
noted here that there were three classes of student
position: "freshman," "sophomore," and "junior &
senior" because there was only one subject who was
a senior). Including both the age and position
variables in the regression would have created a
multicolinearity problem.
7.

The enumeration scores of the four other
symptoms were averaged (rather than entered as
a set) because of their moderate interrelationship.
When all five scores were intercorrelated it was
found that the Pearson coefficients ranged from
.20 to .63. The average was .44. Seven of the ten
coefficients were statistically significant (all
£'S ~ .011), and two others approached the .05
level of significance (£'S - .061 and .075). Again,
there was a concern about multicolinearity.

8.

The means in Table 8 are higher then what can
be computed from the frequencies in Tables 2-6.
This is because the means in Table 8 are a function
of everything that was listed by subjects. The
frequencies in the other tables are a function of
categories that were created by grouping similar
responses. For example, if a student wrote that
a headache can be caused by (1) pressure, (2)
stress, (3) tension, and (4) an allergy, he or she
received an enumeration score of 4. This is
because enumeration was viewed as a measure of the
extent to which causes came to mind. The score
was thought to be a reflection of cognitive activity. However, grouping the types of causes that
were mentioned by the above student, only categories
of "stress" and "an allergy" would be checked. This
is because the first and third responses are synonymous with stress. If grouping did not occur in this
fashion, Tables 2-6 would be unmanageably large.

9.

Before Study 2 was conducted, eight subjects
were interviewed with the Symptom Attribution
Survey. The purpose of these pilot interviews was
to test the instrument and to correct any problems
with it.
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10.

In addition to this, scheduling was a constant
problem throughout the eight months that data were
collected (11/3/86 - 6/24/87). Having to schedule
two visits with each subject would have significantly increased the time needed to collect data.

11.

For subjects who believed that their symptom
could have multiple causes, their enumeration score
was the number of entries for item 17. For those
who believed that their symptom could only have one
cause, their enumeration score was assigned a value
of 1.

12.

Data on the subjective meaning of "being sick"
were collected, but are not reported in this study.

13.

If more than one person was consulted, the
subject was asked to focus upon the first person
with whom he or she talked.

14.

At the outset of Study 2 there was an interest
in analyzing the tendency to make a reattribution as
a function of the information from health professionals and medical guides. It was found, however, that only a few people discussed their symptom
with a physician or sought the help from a medical
guide. As a result, an analysis could not be
conducted because there were not enough subjects to
create contingency tables with cell sizes greater
than one or two. In a number of instances cell
frequencies were zero, thus making it impossible
to create two dimensional contingency tables.

15.

It should be kept in mind that these figures
reflect a national sample. Because college undergraduates are a subsample of those 15-24 years of
age, the percentage of seeking health care for a
headache might be lower than 13.6%.

16.

Symptom duration exhibited a great deal of
variability. The following is a more detailed
description:
Symptom
Proportion
Duration
of Sample

< 1 day
1 - 2.5 days

.34
.16
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3 - 4
5 - 6
1
1+ - 4
6 - 22

17.

days
days
week
weeks
weeks

.08
.04
.09
.24

.OS

In order to compare the actual attributions
made by subjects in Studies 1 and 2 it was important that the symptoms be as similar as possible.
The decision was made that a subject from Study 2
would be selected for this analysis if and only
if he or she had a symptom that was identical to
one of the hypothetical symptoms presented in Study
1 and there .!!..!.!. .!!..!?. other coexisting symptoms.
Thus, subjects who experienced a headache, upset
stomach, or sore throat satisfied this criterion.
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SYMPTOM SURVEY

This is a short survey about peoples' perceptions of the causes for physical symptoms.
On the following pages, we would like you to write down what you feel are the possible
causes for five common symptoms.
Please read the instructions on each page and take as much time as you need. If
you have any questions, please notify the study coordinator.
We wish to thank you in advance for your participation in this study.
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for:
A HEADACHE

Take your time and Ust as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to
mind.
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need.

Use the back of this sheet If you need more space to write.
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for:
WATERVEVES

Take your time and list as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to
mind.
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need.

Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write.
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for:

A CONGESTED NOSE
Take your time and list as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to
mind.
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need.

Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write.
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for:
AN UPSET STOMACH

Take your time and list as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to
mind.
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need.

Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write.
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On the Lines below, please list what you feel are the possible causes for:

A SORE THROAT
Take your time and list as many causes as you can think of. There are no right or
wrong answers on this task, so do not hesitate to write down anything that comes to
mind.
Please write one cause per line. Use as many or as few lines as you need.

14

Use the back of this sheet if you need more space to write.
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1-(1)
1.

(4)

Please write in your age on the line below.

(5) (6)
2.

Please circle your gander category.
1. Male

3.

2. Female

(7)

Please circle the one category that best describes your racial affiliation.
1. Caucasian
(not a Hispanic Origin)

4. Oriental/Asian or Pacific Islander

2. Black

5. American Indian or Alaskan Native

3. Hispanic

6. Other (please specify _ _ _ _ _ __,

(8)

4.

Please circle the one category that best describes your position at LoyolL
1. Freshman

4. Senior

2. Sophomore

5. Unclassttied Student

3. Junior

6. Other (please specify _ _ _ _ ___,

(9)

5.

Ara you a nursing or other type of health professions student? (note that
Individuals who are enrolled In premedical and pradantal programs are
health professions students).
(circle one)

nm

1. Yes

6.

Ara you a trained health professional (such as a nurse or physical
therapist)? (circle one)
1. Yes

7.

(10)

2. No

(11)

2. No

Please write In your overall grade point average on the line below. If you do
not know your GPA or are unsure of It, put an "X" on the line.

(12)

(14)
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SYMPTOM ATTRIBUTION
SURVEY

An interview schedule to assess the cognitions and behaviors
of making attributions for physical symptoms

James M. Sinacore
Loyola University of Chicago
Department of Psychology

2-{1) -

-

-

Date_ _ _ _ __

-(6)

(7)

{8) -(10)

(TI)

(12)

Subject number_ _ _ __

Interviewer _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Form sas-011287
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INTRODUCTION
This interview deals with the experience of bodily sensations and physical symptoms.
l would like to talk with you for a few minutes about the symptoms that you have
experienced within the last 3 to 4 weeks. I am interested in how you as an individual
think about your symptoms--so there are no right or wrong answers to the questions
that I am going to ask you. I'd like you to respond to my questions in any way that
reflects your personal understanding of your symptoms.
In our discussion today I am using the word "symptom• to refer to any uncomfortable or
unpleasant bodily sensation such as a headache, sore musdes, upset stomach,
earache, and anything else like that. I also am using the word "symptom" to refer to any
unusual change in body appearance or function such as hair loss, skin discoloration,
blurred vision, painless lumps, and anything else like that
As we continue our discussion, do not hesitate to stop me in order to clarify a question
for you. It is important that you understand each question -- and answer it in terms of
your own thinking. If you happen to think of something along the way that you forgot to
mention earlier, just tell me and I'll go back and modify any of your answers.
Do you have any questions before we get started?

•rr111l'llom: - - - - - - - -

(13)

(14)(15)

(16)
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01.

As you know, there are times when we experience a single symptom -- and there
are times when we experience a number of symptoms all at the same time. For
our discussion today I'd like you to think about your experience with a symptom
or set of symptoms that occurred sometime within the last 3 to 4 weeks.
Please tell me what the symptom or symptoms were.

(17)

- - - - - - - - - - - (29)
-

(18)

During the interview, I want us to talk about the most recent occurrence of this
symptomatic experience. Please do not refer to earlier occurrences unless I ask
you to.
02.

About how long ago did the symptom(s) start to appear?

(30)(31)
03.

Are you still feeling the symptom(s)?
1 -- yes [go to
2--no*

a. 4)
(32)

• Pf single ~m go to a. &J
• pr multiple ~ma go to a. 5)
04.

In your estimation, about how how far along are you in terms of the course of your
symptom(s)? Would you say that you are at the begining, -- toward the middle, -or toward the end?
1 -- begining
2-middle

3-end

(33)

I realize that you are still experiencing your symptom(s) to some degree, but
during our discussion I'll refer to it (them) in the past tense. This is because most
people who I am talking with are no longer feeling their symptom. If this becomes
confusing, just stop me and I'll try to rephrase my question. Is that OK? *

• Pf single ~m go to a. &J
• pr multiple ayrr¢oma go to a. 5)
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05.

Do you think that your symptoms were related in some way? In other words. do
you think that your symptoms were interconnected?
1 -- yes
2 -- no [circle BYl'l1*>m that subject wtll
talk about and go to Q.6]

(34)

Since you feel that these symptoms were interconnec1ed, I will refer to them as a
symptom cluster as we continue our discussion. Is that OK?

06.

I would like you to tell me a few fac1s about your symptom (cluster). I am
particularly interested in the following.
(a) Using the response scale on page 1 of your handout, select a number that
indicates how much physical discomfort your symptom (cluster) caused you.
Please note that a 1 indicates "very little discomfort• -· and 1O indicates •a lot
of discomfort."
2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

10
(35)

(b) About how long did the symptom (cluster) last?
[If &yn1)tom la still present. ask Instead: How long has your symptom
(cluster) lasted?)

(36)(37) (38)(39)

(c) Using the response scale on page 2 of your handout. select a number that
indicates how serious you thought your symptom (cluster) was. Please
note that a 1 indicates •not very serious• -- and 10 indicates "very serious."
2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

10

(40)

(d) Were there any common or routine activities - no matter how small -- that
your symptom (cluster) made difficult or unusually hard to do?
1 ··yes
2 -- no [go to a. 7]

(41)

(e) What activities were affected, and in what way were they affec1ed?

- - (44)
-

(42)
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07.

Have you experienced this symptom (cluster) before?
(45)

1 --yes
2 -·no [go to Q. 11]

08.

Using the response scale on page 3 of your handout, select the letter that
indicates about how often you experience this symptom (cluster).

A B C D E
2

09.

3

4

(46)

5

Do you think that your recent experience with this symptom (cluster) was similar

to previous experiences, or was it different in some way?
1 -- similar [go to Q. 11]
2 - different
(47)

1O.

In what way was it different?

(48)

11.

(50)

In general, do you think that
(.STATE SVMPTOM (CLUSTEBU is
caused by one factor •• or can it be caused by more than one factor?
1 •• multiple factors [go to Q. 17]
2 •• single factor
(51)

12.

What do you think is the sole cause of
CAUSE #1

(.STATE syMpTOM <CLUSTEBlJ ?
(SKIP)

I am now going to give you a form - and would like you rate this cause on a
number of different scales. Please read all the directions carefully •• and take as
much time as you need. Don't hesitate to ask me any questions.
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13.

When you first experienced your symptom (duster) did you think that cause #1
was the cause if it?
(52)

1 •• yes [go to 0. 23]
2 ·-no
14.

Since you feel that
[STATE SYMPTOM <CLUSTEB)J is caused only by
cause #1, why do you think that it did not come to mind when you first began to
experience the symptom?

(53)

15.

Did cause #1 come to mind at a later time?
1 -yes
2 •• no f.STOP .. ENO THE INTERVIEW]

16.

(55)

(56)

About how long after you began to experience your symptom (cluster) did you
think that cause #1 was the cause? •

(57)(58)

• [go to Q. 23]

215

17.

I'd like you to take a few minutes and think about the causes of

[STATE

SYMPTOM <CLUSTER}]. Tell me out loud what you think the causes are ..
and I'll write them down as you say them. Please say anything that comes to
your mind.

(number causes In the order given by respondent)

[prorr.,t Anything else?]

(59)(60)

'I
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18.

When you first experienced your symptom (duster) did you think about what was
causing it?
1 •• yes [go to

a. 22]

2 ··no
(61)
19.

Since you feel that (§TATE SYMPTOM CCLUSTEB>J can be caused by
a number of factors, why do you think that none of these factors came to mind
when you first began to experience your symptom (cluster)?

(62)

20.

(64)

Did you think about a cause at a later time?
(65)

1 ··yes
2 -· no [STOP - END THE INTERVIEW)

21.

About how long after you began to experience your symptom (duster) did you
think about what was causing it?

(66) (67)

22.

What was the very first cause that you thought about?
(68)(69)

23.

Were there any qualities of the symptom (cluster) such as its location, its level of
discomfort, its duration or its behavior that lad you to think that cause #1 was the
cause?

1 --yes
2 •• no [go to a. 25]

(70)
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24.

What was or were the aspects of the symptom (cluster) that made you think
about cause #1?

3-(

25.

1)- -(4)

When you thought that cause #1 might be the cause of your symptom (cluster),
did you do anything to help relieve the symptom (cluster)?

1 -- yes
2 •• no [go to Q. 30]
26.

Please tell me what kinds of things you did to help relieve your symptom when
you thought that cause #1 was the cause. If you did multiple things, try to
remember the order in which you did them.

( 5)
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27.

Sometimes the things we do to relieve our symptoms work, other times they do
not. Would you say that the result of your action(s) to relieve your symptom
(cluster) tended to make you doubt that cause #1 was the cause -· would you
say that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact that
cause #1 was the cause -- or would you say that the result of your action(s)
didn't affect your thinking in either way?

(12)

1 •• doubt cause
2 -- support cause [go to Q. 29]
3 -- no effect [go to Q. 31]

28.

Why do you think that the result of your action(s) tended to make you doubt that
cause #1 was the cause of your symptom (duster)? •

(13)

(15)

• [go to Q. 31]

29.

Why do you think that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact
that cause #1 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)?•

(16)

• [go to Q. 31]

(18)
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30.

Why didn't you try to relieve your symptom (cluster) in some way?

(19)- (21)

31.

There are times when we experience a symptom and think that we are sick -there are other times when we have a symptom and do not think that we are
sick. When you thought that your symptom (cluster) might be caused by
cause #1, did you think of yourself as being sick?

(22)

1 --yes
2 -- no [go to a. 33]
32.

What was it that made you think that you were sick? *

(23)

(25)

(26)

(28)

• [go to a. 34)
33.

Why Is it that you did not see yourself as being sick?
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34.

Did you talk with any nonmedical person -- such as a friend or relative -- about
your symptom (duster) when you thought that cause #1 was the cause?
1 --yes
2 -- no (go to Q. 48]

35.

How many nonmedical people did you talk with at this time?
(30)(31)

Using the list on page 4 of your handout, please identify the person or persons
who you spoke with. Just call off the letter or letters that apply to you.
A

B

C

0

E

F

G

H

1•

Frequency _ _ - - _ _ - - -

(32)(33)(34)(35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40)

·Pf I ask:

Who was that? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

pt respondent lden1lfl88 more 1han one person, then read)
I know that you spoke with more than one person, but for our discussion today I
would like to talk with you only about the first person you talked with.
36.

Did you talk with this person with the intention of discussing your symptom
(cluster)?
1 -·yes

2 ··no

(41)

37.

During your conversation, did this person tell you what he or she thought might
be causing your symptom (duster)?
1 -- yes
2--no (gotoQ41]

(42)
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38.

Did he or she think that your symptom was caused by cause #1?

(43)

1 -- yes

2 -- no fgo to a 45]

39.

Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause 11 was the cause of
your symptom (duster)?

(44)

1 -- yes fgo to a. 48)
2 -- no
40.

Why not? •

(45)

(47)

• f9o to a. 48)
41.

Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you think more
strongly that cauH 11 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)?

(48)

1 -- yes
2 -- no fgo to a. 43)

42.

What did he or she say? •

(49)

• f9o to a. 48]

(51)
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43.

Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you start to
doubt that cause #1 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)?

1 -- yes
2 •• no [go to Q. 48]

44.

(52)

What did he or she say? •

(53)

(55)

(56)

(58)

• [go to Q. 48)

45.

46.

What did this person think was causing your symptom (cluster)?

Did this tend to make you doubt that cause #1 was the cause of your symptom
(cluster)?
(59)

1 •• yes [go to Q. 48]
2 ··no
47.

Why not?

(60)

(62)
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48.

Did you visit a doctor or nurse to discuss your symptom (cluster) when you
thought that cause #1 was the cause?

(63)

1 -- yes

2 -- no [go to a. 57]

49.

[read @lllli!w If a. 34 Is yes)
Did you visit a medical person before -- or after you spoke with a friend
regarding your symptom (cluster)?

1 -- before
(64)

2 -- after

50.

Why did you decide to go to a health professional?

(65)

51.

(67)

Did the doctor or nurse think that your symptom (cluster) was caused by

cause..,?
(68)

1 -- yes

2 -- no [go to a. 54)
3 -- don't know [go to a. 57]

52.

Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause .., was the cause of
your symptom (cluster)?

(69)
1 -- yes [go to a. 57]
2 -- no
53.

Why not? •

(70)

• [go to a. 57)

(72)
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54.

What did the doctor or nurse think was causing your symptom (cluster)?

4-( 1)

55.

Did this tend to make you doubt that cause #1 was the cause of your symptom
(cluster)?
1 -- yes (go to
2 -- no

56.

( 4)

( 5)

a. 57]

Why not? •

( 6)

57.

When you thought that cauae #1 was causing your symptom, did you refer to
any type of medical guide to do some reading on the subject?

1 -- yes

( 9)

2 -- no [go to a. 62)

58.

( 8)

Did you find any information that tended to make you feel more strongly that
cause #1 was the cause of your symptom?

1 -- yes

(10)

2 -- no [go to a. 60)

59.

What did you read?

(11)

• (go to a. 62J

(13)
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60.

Did you find any information that tended to make you doubt that cause #1 was
the cause of your symptom?
1 -- yes
2 -- no [go to a. 62]

61.

(14)

What did you read?

(15)

62.

Overall, what would you say it was that gave you the due to think that
cause #1 might be the cause of your symptom?
1 -- [if answered] [go to Q. 63)
2 -- [if !W answered} [go to Q. 64)

63.

(17)

(18)

What was it?

(19)

(21)
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64.

Was there anything that gave you the impression to think that perhaps
cause #1might not be the cause of your symptom?

1 -- yes
2 -- no [go to Q. 66)

65.

(22)

What was it?

(23)

66.

(25)

After you thought about cauae #1, did you think about any other cause that
might account for your symptom (cluster)?
(26)

1 -- yes (go to Q. 68)
2 -- no•

• Pf respondent bellews In only alngle cause go to a. 159, else go to
a. 67J
67.

You said earlier that STATE SYMPTOM (CLUSTER> can be caused by
more than one factor, yet when you experienced your symptom (cluster) you only
considered cause #1. Why do you think that other causes didn't come to mind?

(27)

·(go to a. 159]

(29)
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68.

What was the second cause that you thought of - that is, what was the cause that
you thought of after you thought of cause #1?
(30)(31)

69.

Were there any qualities of the symptom (cluster) such as its location, its level of
discomfort, its duration, or its behavior that led you to think that cause #2 was
the cause?
1 ··yes
2 •• no fgo to a. 71)

70.

(32)

What was or were the aspects of the symptom (duster) that made you think
about cause #2?

(33)

71.

(35)

When you thought that cause '2 might be the cause of your symptom (duster),
did you do anything to help relieve the symptom (cluster)?
1 -yes
2 •• no fgo to a. 76)

(36)
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72.

Please tell me what kinds of things you did to help relieve your symptom when
you thought that cause #2 was the cause. If you did multiple things, try to
remember the order in which you did them.
[prol11't Did you think that was helpful?]
.........•••.••••... yes

no dk
(37)

•.•......•.•.•.....• yes

no dk
(38)

.....•.........•.... yes

no dk
(39)

•....•.•.•....••.•.. yes

no dk
(40)

...••..•...•••...••• yes

no dk
(41)

.•.•....•.•.....•.•. yes

no dk
(42)

73.

Sometimes the things we do to relieve our symptoms work, other times they do
not. Would you say that the result of your action(s) to relieve your symptom
(cluster) tended to made you doubt that cauM 12 was the cause ·- would you
say that the result of your actlon(s) tended to support the fact that
cauM #2 was the cause •• or would you say that the result of your action(s)
didn't affect your thinking in either way?
1 -- doubt cause
2 ·- support cause (go tlO Q. 75]
3 •• no effect (go tD Q. 77]

74.

(43)

Why do you say that the result of your action(s) tended to make you doubt that
cause 12 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? •

(44)

• (go tlO Q. 77]

(45)
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75.

Why do you say that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact that
caua. #2 was the ca.use of your symptom (duster)?•

(47)

(49)

(50)

(52)

• [go to Q. 77)

76.

77.

Why didn't you try to relieve your symptom (cluster) In some way?

There are times when we experience a symptom and think that we are sick··
there are other times when we have a symptom and do not think that we are
sick. When you thought that your symptom (cluster) was ca.used by caua. '2,
did you think of yourself as being sick?
1 ··yes
2 •• no (go to Q. 79)

(53)
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78.

What was it that made you think that you were sick? •

• [go to a.
79.

80.

(54)

(56)

(57)

(59)

soi

Why is it that you did not see yourself as being sick?

Did you talk with any nonmedlcal person -- such as a friend or relative -- about
your symptom (cluster) when you thought that cauae ~was the cause?
(60)

1 -- yes

2 -- no (go to a. 94]
81.

How many nonmedical people did you talk with at this time?

(61 )(62)
Using the list on page 4 of your handout, please identify the person or persons
who you spoke with. Just call off the letter or letters that apply to you.

Fl8qU8flC)'

A

B

c· D.

-

-

-

-

E
-

F

G

-

-

H
-

1*
-

(63)(64)(65)(66)(67)(68)(69)(70)(71)

*Pf I ask: Who was that? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

[If respondent ldentlftee more than one person, then read]
I know that you spoke with more than one person, but for our discussion today I
would like to talk with you only about the first person you talked with.
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82.

Did you talk with this person with the Intention of discussing your symptom
(cluster)?

1 ··yes
2 ··no

83.

5·( 1)

During your conversation, did this person tell you what he or she thought might
be causing your symptom (cluster)?

1 -·yes
2 -- no [go to a 87)

84.

( 3)

Did he or she think that your symptom was caused by cause #2?

(4)

1 ··yes
2 -- no [go to a 91)

85.

( 2)

Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause #2 was the cause of
your symptom (cluster)?

( 5)
1 •• yes [go to
2 -- no

86.

a. 94)

Why not? •

( 6)

• [go to a. 94J

( 8)
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87.

Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you think more
strongly that cau. . '2 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)?

1 ··yes
2 •• no [go to Q.

88.

( 9)

89J

What did he or she say? •

(10)

(12)

• [go to Q. 94]

89.

Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you start to
doubt that cause 1112 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)?
(13)

1 ··yes
2 ··no (goto Q. 94]

90.

What did he or she say? •

(14)

• [go to Q. 94]

(16)
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91.

What did this person think was causing your symptom (cluster)?

(17)

92.

Did this tend to make you doubt that cause #2 was the cause of your symptom
(cluster)?

(20)

1 •• yes (go to a. 94]
2 ··no

93.

Whynot?

(21)

94.

(23)

Did you visit a doctor or nurse to disruss your symptom (cluster) when you
thought that cauM 12 was the cause?

1 ··yes
2 •• no [go to Q. 103]

95.

(19)

(24)

(read ciroDw If Q. 80 Is y•)
Old you visit a medical person before •• or after you spoke with a friend
regarding your symptom (cluster)?

1 .. before
2- after
96.

(25)

Why did you decide to go to a health professional?

(26)

(28)
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97.

Did the doctor or nurse think that your symptom (cluster) was caused by
cause#2?

1 -- yes

(29)

2 -- no [go to a. 100)
3 -- don't know [go to a. 103)

98.

Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause #2 was the cause of
your symptom (duster)?
(30)
1 -- yes [go to
2 -- no

99.

a. 103)

Why not? *

(31)

(33)

·[go to a. 103)
100. What did the doctor or nurse think was causing your symptom (cluster)?

(34)

(36)

1 01. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause 12 was the cause of your symptom
(cluster)?
(37)
1 -- yes [go to
2 -- no

a. 103)

102. Why not?

(38)

(40)
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1 03. When you thought that cause #2 was causing your symptom, did you refer to
any type of medical guide to do some reading on the subject?

1 -- yes

(41)

2 -- no [go to a. 108]

1 04. Did you find any information that tended to make you feel more strongly that
cause #2 was the cause of your symptom?

(42)

1 -- yes

2 -- no [go to a. 106]

1 05. What did you read?

(43)

(45)

·[go to a. 108]
106. Did you find any information that tended to make you doubt that cause #2 was
the cause of your symptom?

1 -- yes

(46)

2 -- no [go to a. 108]

107. What did you read?

(47)

(49)

108. Overall, what would you say it was that gave you the clue to think that
cause #2 might be the cause of your symptom?

1 -- [it answered) [go to a. 109]
2 -- [if aiiL.answered) (go to a. 110]

(50)
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109. What was it?

(51)

(53)

11 o. Was there anything that gave you the impression to think that perhaps
cause #2 might not be the cause of your symptom?
(54)

1 -- yes

2 -- no [go to Q, 112]

111 . What was it?

(55)

(57)

112. After you thought about cause #2, did you think about any other cause that
might account for your symptom (duster)?
1 -- yes

(58)

2 -- no [go to Q. 159]
113. What was the third cause that you thought of-- that is, what was the cause that
you thought of after you thought of cause #2?

(59)(60)
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114. Were there any qualities of the symptom (cluster) such as its location, its level of
discomfort, its duration, or its behavior that led you to think that cauae #3 was
the cause?

1 ··yes
2 ··no [go to Q. 116]

(61)

115. What was or were the aspects of the symptom (duster) that made you think
about cauae #3?

(62)

(64)

116. When you thought that cauae #3 might be the cause of your symptom (duster),
did you do anything to help relieve the symptom (cluster)?

1 ··yes
2 •• no [go to a. 121)

(65)
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117. Please tell me what kinds of things you did to help relieve your symptom when
you thought that cau• #3 was the cause. If you did multiple things, try to
remember the order in which you did them.
(prompt Did you think that was helpful?]
••....•.••••....•... yes

no dk

&-( 1)( 2)
••.•.•••••.•...•..•• yes

no dk
( 3)

•.•...•••...••••.••• yes

no dk
( 4)

.•••.•.•••..••••.•.• yes

no dk
( 5)

•••••.••••••.••••••. yes

no dk
( 6)

••.••.•••••••••••••• yes

no dk
( 7)

118. Sometimes the things we do to relieve our symptoms work, other times they do
not. Would you say that the result of your actlon(s) to relieve your symptom
(cluster) tended to made you doubt that came #3 was the cause •• would you
say that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact that
cause #3 was the cause ··or would you say that the result of your action(s)
didn't affect your thinking in either way?
1 •• doubt cause
2 •• support cause (go to Q. 120]
3 ··no effect (go to Q. 122)

( 8)

119. Why do you say that the result of your action(s) tended to make you doubt that
cause #3 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? •

(Q)-(11)

·(go to a.

1221
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120. Why do you say that the result of your action(s) tended to support the fact that
cause #3 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)? •

(12)

(14)

(15)

(17)

• [go m a. 1221
121 . Why didn't you try to relieve your symptom (cluster) in some way?

122. There are times when we experience a symptom and think that we are sick -there are other times when we have a symptom and do not think that we are
sick. When you thought that your symptom (cluster) was caused by cause #3,
did you think of yourself as being sick?
1 -yes

2 •• no [go 1D a. 124]

(18)
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123. What was it that made you think that you were sick? •

(19)

(21)

(22)

(24)

• [go to Q. 125)

124. Why is it that you did not see yourself as being sick?

125. Did you talk with any nonmedical person - such as a friend or relative -- about

your symptom (duster) when you thought that cauu '3 was the cause?
1 --yes
2 ··no [go to Q. 139)

(25)

126. How many nonmedical people did you talk with at this time?
(26)(27)

Using the list on page 4 of your handout, please identify the person or persons
who you spoke with. Just call off the letter or letters that apply to you.
A

Frequency -

B

-

C

-

D

-

E

-

F

-

G

-

H

-

I*

-

(28)(29) (30)(31 )(32)(33)(34)(35)(36)

•[If I ask: Who was that? _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ __

Pf reapondent Identifies more 1han OM person, then rNd)
I know that you spoke with more than one person, but for our discussion today I
would like to talk with you only about the first person you talked with.
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127. Did you talk with this person with the intension of discussing your symptom
(cluster)?

1 -- yes
2-- no

(37)

128. During your conversation, did this person tell you what he or she thought might
be causing your symptom (cluster)?

(38)

1 --yes

2 -- no [go to Q 132]

129. Did he or she think that your symptom was caused by cause 113?
(39)

1 --yes
2 -- no [go to Q 136]

130. Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause 113 was the cause of
your symptom (cluster)?
(40)

1 -·yes [gO to Q. 139]
2 --no
131. Why not?•

(41)

• [go to Q. 139]

(43)
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132. Was there anything that this person said that in some way made you think more
strongly that cause t3 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)?

1 ·-yes
2 -- no [go to Q. 134)

(44)

133. What did he or she say? •

{45)

(47)

• [go to Q. 139)

134. Was there anything that this person said that In some way made you start to
doubt that cause t3 was the cause of your symptom (cluster)?
1 --yes
2 -- no [go to a. 139)

(48)

135. What did he or she say?•

(49)

• [go to Q. 139)

(51)
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136. What did this person think was causing your symptom (cluster)?

(52)

(54)

137. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause 413 was the cause of your symptom
(cluster)?
(55)

1 -- yes [go to a. 130]
2 -- no

138. Why not?

(56)- (58)

139. Did you visit a doctor or nurse to discuss your symptom (cluster) when you
thought that cause '3 was the cause?
1 --yes
2 -- no [go to Q. 148]

(59)

140. [read clllliJW If Q. 125 la y.s]
Did you visit a medical person before -- or after you spoke with a friend
regarding your symptom (cluster)?
1 -- before
2- after

(60)

141. Why did you decide to go to a health professional?

(61)

(63)
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142. Did the doctor or nurse think that your symptom (cluster) was caused by
cause#3?

7-( 1)( 2)

1 -- yes

2 -- no [go to a. 145)
3 -- don't know [go to a. 148)

143. Did this tend to make you think more strongly that cause #3 was the cause of
your symptom (cluster)?

( 3)

1 -- yes [go to a. 148)
2 -- no
144. Why not? •

( 4)

( 6)

( 7)

( 9)

• [go to a. 148)
145. What did the doctor or nurse think was causing your symptom (cluster)?

146. Did this tend to make you doubt that cause #3 was the cause of your symptom
(cluster)?

(10)

1 -- yes [go to Q. 148)
2 -- no
147. Why not?•

(11)

(13)
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148. When you thought that cauae 13 was causing your symptom, did you refer to
any type ot medical guide to do some reading on the subject?
1 ··yes

(14)

2 -- no [go ta Q. 153]

149. Did you find any Information that tended to make you feel more strongly that
cause 13 was the cause of your symptom?

1 •• yes

(15)

2 -- no fgo ta a. 151]

150. What did you read?

(16)

(18)

• [go ta a. 153]
151. Did you find any information that tended to make you doubt that cauee 13 was
the cause of your symptom?

1 --yes
2 •• no (9o ta Q. 153]

(19)

152. What did you read?

(20)

(22)

153. Overall, what would you say it was that gave you the due to think that
cause 13 might be the cause of your symptom?

1 -- {if inswered} [go ta a. 154]
2 -- {if
answered} [go tD a. 155]

am

(23)
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154. What was it?

(24)

(26)

155. Was there anything that gave you the impression to think that perhaps
cause #3 might not be the cause of your symptom?
(27)

1 --yes

2 -- no (go to Q. 157)

156. What was it?

(28)

(30)

157. After you thought about cause #3, did you think about any other cause that
might account for your symptom (cluster)?

1 -yes
2 -- no [go to Q. 159]

(31)
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158. Please tell me what the cause or causes were. If you thought about more than

one more cause, try to remember the order in which you thought about them.
[pron1)t anything else?)
CAUSE #4
(32)(33)
CAUSE #5
(34)(35)
CAUSE#6
(36)(37)
CAUSE#7
(38)(39)
CAUSE#B
(40)(41)
CAUSE #9
(42)(43)
CAUSE #10
(44)(45)
159. I assume, then, that cause #laat was the last cause that you considered. Is that

right?
(46)

1 ··yes [go to Q. 161]
2 ··no
160. What was the last cause that you thought about?

our discussion regarding your symptom (cluster). Would you like
me to go back and change or modify any of your answers?

161. This concludes

(47)

1 ·• yes [modify answers ihen STOP]
2 ··no [STOP]
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very little
discomfort

a lot of
discomfort

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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not very
serious

very
serious

1 2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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A

B

have never or
almost never
experienced
the symptom

less than
3or4
times per
year

C

D

every every week
month
or so
or so

E
more than
once every
week
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A-coworker
B - friend
C-parent
D - brother I sister
E -- other relative
F-- roommate
G- clergy
H-spouse
I - other (please specify)
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HEALTH OPINION SURVEY

The questions on the next two pages ask for your opinions about different kinds of
health care. For each statement, decide whether you .agr.u. or disagree and cirde the
answer which l2ast. fits your opinion. Each person Is different, so there are no "right" or
"wrong" answers. Please circle an answer for each question. Do not leave any
blank. Even if you find that you don't completely agree or disagree with a statement,
choose the 20§. answer that comes~ to what you believe.
If you have any questions, please ask the study coordinator.
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For each question, circle
the one answer that comes
~IQIHl tg wbat ~QU b~li~ll!i
I usually don't ask the doctor or nurse many questions
about what they're doing during a medical exam.

Agree

Disagree

_12-{ 1)

Except for serious illness, irs generally better to take
care of your .Qlf.D. health than to seek professional help.

Agree

Disagree

_(2)

Agree

Disagree

_(3)

Agree

Disagree

_(4)

Agree

Disagree

_(5)

since it§ !2g!il fgc mildi"5&1 g;isgga§ 112 la~g cg§QQCJ§ibililJ'. for health-care.

Agree

Disagree

_(6)

Leaming how to cure some of your illness without
contacting a physician is a good idea

Agree

Disagree

_(7)

about the procedures during a medical exam.

Agree

Disagree

_(8)

It's almost always better to seek professional help
than to try to treat yourself.

Agree

Disagree

_(9)

10. It's better to trust the doctor or nurse in charge of a
medical procedure than to question what they are
doing.

Agree

Disagree

_(10)

11 . Leaming how to cure some of your illness without
contacting a physician may create more harm than
good.

Agree

DilagrM

_(11)

12. Recovery is usually quicker under the care of a
doctor or nurse than when patients take care of
tbgm§glves.

Agree

Disagree

_(12)

1.

2.

3. I'd rather have doctors and nurses make the decisions
about what's best than for them to give me a whole lot
of choices.

4. Instead of waiting for them to tell me, I usually ask the
doctor or nurse immediately after an exam about my
health.

5. It is better to rely on the judgements of doctors (who
are experts) then to rely on "common sense" in taking
care or your own body.

6. Clinics and hospitals are good places to go for help

7.

8. I usually ask the doctor or nurse lots of questions
9.

256

13. If it costs the same, I'd rather have a doctor or nurse
give me treatments than to do the same treatments
myself.

Agl'll8

Disagree

_(13)

14. It is better to rely less on physicians and more on
your own common sense when it comes to caring
for your body.

Pgee

Disagree

_(14)

15. I usually wait for the doctor or nurse to tell me about
the results of a medical exam rather than asking them
immediately.

Ag/ea

Oillagnle

(15)

16. I'd rather be given many choices about what's best
for my health than to have the doctor make the decisions
for me.

Ag/ea

Oillagnle

_(16)
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SYMPTOM CHECKLIST

On the following pages, several common symptoms or bodily sensations are listed.
Most people have experienced most of these feelings at one time or another. We are
currently interested in discovering how prevalent each symptom is among college
students. All information will be considered confidential.

DIRECTIONS
Please read each of the symptoms on the next few pages and circle the letter which
indicates how frequently you experience that symptom. Use the following scale for
each symptom.

A
Have never or
almost never
experienced
the symptom

B
Less than
3or4
times per

c
Every
month
or so

D
Every week
or so

E
More than
once every
week

year

For example, if your eyes tend to water once every week or two, you would circle letter

D.
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers to this task. Please respond to each symptom
in terms of your own experience. If you have any questions, please ask the study
coordinator.
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A
Have never or
almost never
experienced
the symptom

B
Less than
3or4
times per
year

c

D

Every
month
or so

Every week
or so

1 . Eyes water

A

B

2. Itching or painful eyes

A

B

3. Ringing in ears

A

B

4. Temporary deafness or hard of hearing

A

B

5. lump in throat

A

B

6. Choking sensations

A

B

7. Sneezing spells

A

B

8. Running nose

A

B

9. Congested nose

A

B

10. Bleeding nose

A

B

11. Asthma or wheezing

A

B

12. Coughing

A

B

13. Out of breath

A

B

14. Swollen ankles

A

B

15. Chest Pains

A

B

16. Racing heart

A

B

17. Cold hands and feet, even in hot weather

A

B

18. Leg Cramps

A

B

19. Insomnia

A

B

20. Toothaches

A

B

21. Upset stomach

A

B

E
More than
once every
week

c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c

D

E -

D

E

( 2)

D

E

( 3)

D

E

( 4)

D

E

( S)

D

E

( 6)

D

E

( 7)

D

E

( 8)

D

E

( 9)

D

E

(10)

D

E

(11)

D

E

(12)

D

E

(13)

D

E

(14)

D

E

(15)

D

E

(16)

D

E

(17)

D

E

(18)

D

E

(19)

D

E

(20)

D

E

(21)

111-( 1)
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A
Have never or
almost never
experienced
the symptom

c

D

Every
month
or so

Every week
or so

B
Less than
3 or4
times per

E
More than
once every
week

year

22. Indigestion

A

B

23. Heartburn

A

B

24. Severe pains or cramps In stomach

A

B

25. Diarrhea

A

B

26. Constipation

A

B

27. Hemorrhoids

A

B

28. Swollen joints

A

B

29. Stiff muscles

A

B

30. Back pains

A

B

31. Sensitive or tender skin

A

8

32. Face flushes

A

8

33. Severe itching

A

B

34. Skin breaks out in a rash

A

B

35. Acne or pimples on face

A

B

36. Acne or pimples other than face

A

B

37. Boils

A

B

38. Sweat, even in cold weather

A

8

39. Strong reactions to insect bites

A

B

40. Headaches

A

8

41. Sensation of pressure in head

A

8

42. Hot flashes

A

8

c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c

D

E

(22)

D

E

(23)

D

E

(24)

D

E

(25)

D

E

(26)

D

E

(27)

D

E

(28)

D

E

(29)

D

E

(30)

D

E

(31)

D

E

(32)

D

E

(33)

D

E

(34)

D

E

(35)

D

E

(36)

D

E

(37)

D

E

(38)

D

E

(39)

D

E

(40)

D

E

(41)

D

E

(42)

261

A
Have never or
almost never
experienced
the symptom

B
Less than
3or4
times per
year

c

D

Every
month
or so

Every week
or so

E

43. Chills

A

B

44. Dizziness

A

B

45. Feel faint

A

B

46. Numbness or tingling in any part of body

A

B

47. Twitching of eyelid

A

B

48. Twitching other than eyelid

A

B

49. Hands tremble or shake

A

B

50. Stiff joints

A

B

51. Sore muscles

A

B

52. Sore throat

A

B

53. Sunburn

A

B

54. Nausea

A

B

More than
once every
week

c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c

D

E

(43)

D

E

(44)

D

E

(45)

D

E

(46)

D

E

(47)

D

E

(48)

D

E

(49)

D

E

(50)

D

E

(51)

D

E

(52)

D

E

(53)

D

E

(54)
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BODY PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE

The statements on the next page are about the perceptions of one's body. Please rate
each of these statements in terms of how characteristic thay are of your own
perceptions. Each statement should be rated on the scale that goes from O(extremely
uncharacteristic of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic of me). There are no right or
wrong answers to this questionnaire so please make your ratings in accord with your
own personal perceptions. Be sure to rate all 15 statements.
If you have any questions, please ask the study coordinator.
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extreme¥

elllremefy

cl1aracteristic
olme

unchanlctel'i!lic
olme

1. I am sensitive to lntemal bodily tensions.

0

2

3

4

2. I think a lot about my body build.

0

2

3

4

(2)

3. I am concerned about my posture.

0

2

3

4

(3)

4. I like to make sure that my hair looks right. 0

2

3

4

(4)

5. I know immediately when my mouth or
throat gets dry.

0

2

3

4

(5)

6. I'm beter coordinated than most people.

0

2

3

4

(6)

0

2

3

4

(7)

8. I can often feel my heart beating.

0

2

3

4

(8)

9. For my size, I'm pretty strong.

0

2

3

4

('9)

10. lrs important for me that my skin looks
nice ••• for example, has no blemishes.

0

2

3

4

(10)

11. I am quick to sense the hunger
contractions in my stomach.

0

2

3

4

(11)

12. I'm capable of moving quickly.

0

2

3

4

(12)

13. When with others, I want my hands to be
clean and look nice.

0

2

3

4

(13)

14. I'm light on my feet compared to most
people.

0

2

3

4

(14)

15. I'm very aware of my best and worst
facial features.

0

2

3

4

(15)

11-(1)

7. I'm very aware of changes in my body
temperature.
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